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Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary
Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice
Peter C. Kostantt
INTRODUCTION
Large accounting firms, which now call themselves multidisciplinary partnerships (MDPs), are competing with law
firms to provide legal services.' While the heated debate surrounding this development rages, 2 MDPs are enjoying considerable success in their competition with law firms. 3 Legal ethics rules prohibit lawyers from practicing in professional
associations controlled by nonlawyers, 4 but the rules are

t Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law;
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law, Fall
2000; Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of
Law, Spring 2001. I am grateful to the Minnesota Law Review for inviting me
to participate in this Symposium. For helpful suggestions on previous versions of this Article, I would like to thank Kent Greenfield, Jonathan Gutoff,
Richard Painter and John Humbach. My thanks also to the other symposium
participants, and to Jill Radloff, Nathan Ray and Jason Straight of the Minnesota Law Review for their efforts in preparing this Article for publication.
1. For a discussion of these recent developments, see generally Peter C.
Kostant, ParadigmRegained: How Competition from Accounting Firms May
Help CorporateAttorneys To Recapture the Ethical High Ground, 20 PACE L.
REV. (forthcoming 1999). For purposes of this Article, the term "MDP" is intended to encompass all multidisciplinary practice, including those in which
nonlawyers may share ultimate control. The canard that lawyers somehow
lose their professional objectivity when they share profits with nonlawyers has
effectively been disposed of by leading commentators in professional responsibility. See, e.g., 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW
OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT § 5.4:102 (2d ed. 1998) (suggesting that the decisive rationale underlying Model Rule 5.4's flat prohibition on sharing fees is "economic protectionism"); Bruce A. Green, The DisciplinaryRestrictions on Multidisciplinary
Practice: Their Derivation,Their Development, and Some Implications for the
Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1144-49 (2000).
2. See Kostant, supra note 1 (manuscript at 709-13, on file with author).
3. See id. (manuscript at 706-09, on file with author).
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1983).
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largely being ignored 5 or legalistically circumvented, 6 and perhaps are about to change. This Article, drawing on both the
positive and the normative, 7 offers a partial explanation for
what is occurring, and argues that a form of MDP legal practice8 could be a very good thing for corporate law, corporate clients and the ethical rules governing transactional corporate legal practice.9 Using insights of law and economics to explain
how some changes may be occurring, this Article will suggest
ways of encouraging beneficial change. This will require examining the demand for legal services, 10 the moral hazard
problem that all public corporations face due to their agents'
actions, the ways in which both lawyers and accountants can be
reputational intermediaries in third-party enforcement "gatekeeper" regimes," the expressive function of law in generating
norms of corporate behavior and lawyer behavior, and how

5. See Lawrence J. Fox, Defend Our Clients, Defend Our Profession, PA.
LAW., July-Aug. 1999, at 21.
6. MDPs stress that they are not practicing law but instead offering legal
consulting services. See Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (Feb. 4, 1999) (written remarks of Kathryn A. Oberly, Vice Chair and
General Counsel, Ernst & Young, LLP), available at <http'/www.abanet.org/
cpr/oberlyl.html>.
7. The very motive of legal scholarship may necessarily combine positive
and normative arguments. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1393, 1426 (1996).
8. The form herein proposed is emphatically not in accordance with the
model proposed by the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice. See
generally COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR

ASS'N, REPORT (1999), available at <http'/www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.
html> [hereinafter REPORT]. Perhaps the biggest problem with the Report is
that it fails to address problems of confidentiality. See infra Part III.A.
9. The need for contextual practice has been eloquently argued by leading scholars such as David Wilkins, William H. Simon, David Luban and Fred
Zacharias. To date, the organized bar has rejected these proposals. Rule 1.13
has been inadequate in moving to a more contextual ethic for corporate clients.
See infra Part III.A.
10. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 882-89 (1990) (arguing that the
market for legal services makes it more difficult for lawyers to act as gatekeepers). Gilson's article, which focused on the problem of reducing strategic
litigation reached rather pessimistic conclusions about what the market would
allow attorneys to do. See id. My Article uses the changed market conditions
brought about by MDP competition to reach a more optimistic conclusion. I do
not focus on litigation, but suggest that there will be a more beneficial role for
attorneys as gatekeepers in transactional practice for large corporations.
11. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 62-66 (1986).
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and new losers may help
transition rules affecting new winners
12
explain the dynamics of change.
During the past fifteen years there have been substantial
changes in American corporate governance, both with respect
to the laws that regulate public corporations and the norms and
belief systems of corporate constituents. 13 These changes have
made large public corporations more amenable to using MDPs
for transactional legal services. At the same time, the accounting profession has occupied an increasingly important role
4
in monitoring the performance of powerful inside managers.'
MDPs have been very successful in attracting clients for
their legal services. 15 One explanation for this success is a "de
maximus rule:" when enough money is at stake, more powerful
organizations will find a way to prevail over less powerful rivals. MDPs are currently far more powerful than law firms.
Although power dynamics may explain why changes occur, it is
important to channel the changes in beneficial ways. Even if
some of the potential benefits from MDP transactional legal
practice are unintended consequences of the MDP's desire to
grow, these benefits also result from traditional accounting
practice constraints that do not apply to law firms.
Courts, regulators and scholars recognize that a complex,
multi-party gatekeeper regime 16 is necessary for the internal
control and accurate financial disclosure of public corporations. 17 In gatekeeper enforcement regimes liability is "imposed on private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by

12. See generally Saul Levmore, Changes,Anticipations,and Reparations,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657 (1999) (exploring how the law can influence its own
development, using interest group analysis, with reference to "new winners"
and "new losers").
13. Professor Levmore has suggested that the process of legal transition is
affected by tensions between the incentives and disincentives among those
who benefit and lose under new legal rules. See id.; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1999).
14. See infra Part III-A (discussing these developments in corporate governance).
15. See Fox, supra note 5, at 21 (pointing to the success of the MDPs, and
arguing that Model Rule 5.4 is being violated).
16. Reinier Kraakman analyzed this enforcement regime in an important
article in 1986. See Kraakman, supra note 11, at 55-61.
17. See Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of CorporateAudit Committees, 54
BUS. LAW. 1067, 1071 (1999) [hereinafter Blue Ribbon Committee Report]; in'fra Part II.C.1 (discussing the report).
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withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers." 18 Corporate
directors, and especially independent audit committee members and independent accountants, can act as essential gatekeepers. Corporate lawyers, by contrast, have remained on the
sidelines or have been impediments to progress rather than becoming indispensable parties in improving financial disclosure.
Reliance on a flawed model for legal ethics has caused a
failure to employ lawyers effectively. This unitary model insists on treating all lawyers as advocates in an adversarial system. In the process, it often mischaracterizes the duties of loyalty and confidentiality for corporate clients and rejects the
need for ethics that are contextual and that can protect third
parties.' 9 This widely accepted model, with its emphasis on
advocacy rather than counseling, has badly served corporate
clients 20 and perhaps the bar itself.2 1 Furthermore, it fits well
with the needs and aspirations of the powerful inside senior
corporate managers that corporate lawyers have traditionally
served. 22 Now that inside managers have lost some of their
power to new kinds of corporate boards with activist, independent audit committees, 23 newly empowered directors can require
assistance from their corporate lawyers. One way for directors
to assure that corporate lawyers act in the interests of the corporation and not just inside management may be to employ
transactional attorneys who work for MDPs. 24
18. Kraakman, supra note 11, at 53. Unlike "gatekeepers,"
ers" must actually report misconduct. See id. at 58-59.
19.

"whistleblow-

See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF

LAWYERS' ETHICS 7-9 (1998) (arguing that the so-called "Dominant View" requires or at least permits lawyers to pursue any goal of the client through any
arguably legal course of action, and that contextual ethics better protect third
parties).
20. In connection with the savings and loan fiasco, civil actions were
brought against 90 law firms between 1989 and 1993. See Harris Weinstein,
Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 ILL. L. REV. 53, 53.
21. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 7 (1993) (discussing the crisis in America's
legal profession and reaching the "gloomy conclusion" that the lawyerstatesman ideal is a thing of the past); Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911 (1996) (discussing the poor image of lawyers
and arguing that any improvement must derive from the concerted efforts of
law schools and the bar); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futureof Legal Ethics,
100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991).
22.

See REPORT, supra note 8; infra Part IlA.

23. See Blue Ribbon Committee Report, supra note 17, at 1070-71; infra
Part II.C.1.
24. The expanding multi-party gatekeeper regime model of corporate gov-
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By involving lawyers in the gatekeeping function, MDPs
could improve the current system in which many transactional
lawyers inadequately assure the effectiveness of the monitoring
system for financial compliance and may be systematically contributing to audit failures. 25 Because corporate lawyers are
hired, fired and evaluated by inside senior managers and deal
almost exclusively with them, it seems a fair surmise that corporate lawyers sometimes help inside senior managers hide
material information from the board. At any rate, the temptation must be great, and the consequences are sufficiently deleterious to recommend preventive action. Lawyers can use the
narrow attorney-client privilege and the broad ethical rule of
confidentiality to shield themselves and the managers from detection of misconduct. As Dean Daniel Fischel has written,
lawyers as agents face personal liability if they knowingly participate
in a client's illegal scheme. But... the key determinant of liability is
what the attorney "knew" about the scheme. Confidentiality rules
create powerful obstacles to the discovery of attorney participation in
an unlawful scheme .... Secrecy better enables the legal profession
to define its role on 26
its own terms and thus to avoid more public scrutiny of its activities.

The abuse of confidentiality is greatly exacerbated for corporate clients because counsel routinely treat inside senior
managers as if they were the client. Detection of client wrongdoing becomes even less likely because counsel uses the shield
of confidentiality to conceal wrongdoing both inside and outside
the corporation. Inside managers rely on the lawyer's advocacy
27
skills, selective disclosure, confidentiality, and reputation.
ernance is increasingly making directors and accountants into monitors. See
Kraakman, supra note 11, at 65-66. In it, MDP lawyers would be required to
cooperate fully with auditors and audit committees. A good deal has been
written about the heightened duty of directors as monitors, particularly in
Delaware. See 1 JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 9.3 (Supp. 1991); Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1266-71. A very strict fiduciary duty for directors to
make accurate financial disclosure is evolving. See Malone v. Brincat, 722
A.2d 5, 11-12 (Del. 1998). Corporate directors need help to be effective monitors, and by turning to MDPs may be rejecting the organized bar's traditional
ethical model that interfered with lawyers adequately serving corporate clients rather than their senior inside managers.
25. Recent changes in corporate law have clarified that an important role
for the board of directors is to monitor the performance of inside managers.
Attempts by directors, and especially independent directors to meet these
higher duties is largely aspirational but there may also be some expanded exposure to liability. See infra Part III.A.
26. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Cm. L. RaV. 1,
8-9 (1998).
27. The savings and loan cases have become notorious examples of corpo-
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Law has an expressive function in shaping belief systems
and norms. The few cases involving lawyers who assisted or
opposed senior inside managers of corporations involved in illegal activities give credence to the widely held belief that a
"loyal" corporate lawyer is one who treats inside senior managers as the client. In Balla v Gambro, the court denied recovery
to a corporate lawyer on his claim against a corporation that
discharged him when he prevented its senior manager from
selling lethally defective dialysis equipment. 28 Nowhere in its
opinion did the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledge that, in
preventing this criminal and tortious activity, the attorney was
loyally serving his corporate client and protecting it from a
rogue agent. 29 In a somewhat similar vein, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court ordered a mild sanction against a lawyer who
knowingly allowed his friend, the president of a mortgage company, to embezzle funds from the corporate client and from an
out-of-state bank.30 The court reasoned that attorneys were
easily confused by rules governing the identity and confidenti31
ality duty for corporate clients.
rate managers that either engaged in serious misconduct, or were victims of
inadequate protection. Internal documents revealed that some of the most
prestigious law firms may have assisted management in avoiding detection of
illegal schemes and not reporting to independent directors. See Peter C.
Kostant, When Zeal Boils Over: Disclosure Obligationsand the Duty of Candor
of Legal Counsel in Regulatory ProceedingsAfter the Kaye, Scholer Settlement,
25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 487, 500 (1993). Despite a settlement of $41 million, one
large firm continues to deny any misconduct as well as the factual basis of
some of the government's allegations. Neither the ABA Task Force nor the
New York Bar's disciplinary board found cause for discipline. Moreover, many
prominent lawyers agreed with the firm's defense regardless of whether or not
the government's allegations were true. See SIMON, supra note 19, at 7. More
than 90 law firms were sued in connection with the savings and loan debacle.
See Weinstein, supra note 20, at 53.
In amending the statutory duty of accountants, Congress found it significant that 28 of 30 failed savings and loans in California had received clean
audits despite the fact that serious financial improprieties were subsequently
revealed. See Quinton F. Seamons, Audit Standards and Detection of Fraud
Under the Private Securities LitigationReform Act of 1995, 24 SEC. REG. L.J.
259, 266 n.20 (1996) (noting that this fact was cited as an important argument
in favor of the fraud detection requirement for auditors in the 1995 amendments to the federal securities laws). One wonders how many of the attorneys
for these 28 savings and loans hid their suspicions from the auditors.
28. 584 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ill. 1991). The Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding in Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 492
(Ill.
1998).
29. See generally Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 107.
30. See In re Silva, 636 A.2d 316, 316-17 (R.I. 1994).
31. See id.
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This Article will present a market-oriented explanation for
why MDPs may be able to provide better transactional legal
services to large public corporations, and reject the facile explanation that corporations are simply attracted to the convenience of "one-stop shopping." Competition from MDPs may
force virtually all transactional lawyers, even those that do not
work for MDPs, toward a new professional ethic that better assists corporate clients with legal compliance.
The MDP model proposed here would permit MDPs to provide transactional legal services to clients for whom they perform audits only if the corporate clients agree, ex ante, that
lawyers in the MDP firm must share any potentially material
information with the audit engagement partner. 32 This Article
suggests reasons that this model would benefit corporate clients and shows why large public corporations should prefer it.
The strong resistance of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to multidisciplinary auditing firms may be
misplaced because potential advantages for accurate reporting
exist. 33 Indeed, the SEC should welcome the augmented disclosure that this model would provide, instead of focusing on compromised auditor independence. At the very least, transactional attorneys could improve the quality of audits and ensure
that more of the information necessary for good corporate governance and compliance with the law would reach corporate
audit committees. 34 Transactional lawyers working for MDPs
may be better equipped than lawyers in traditional law firms to
further the SEC's goals of full disclosure of material information, effective monitoring by corporate audit committees and
auditors, and the avoidance both of fraud and the chicanery of

32. Although I know of no direct precedent for my proposal, in criticizing
Model Rule 1.13 Richard Painter has suggested models for corporations to
adopt bylaw provisions that would require legal counsel to disclose material
information to the corporate board of directors. See Richard W. Painter &
Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a
Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225, 259-76 (1996). See generally Richard
W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507 (1994); Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for
Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1996) [hereinafter Painter, Toward a Market].
33. See infra Part III.A.
34. One recent development in the governance of large public corporations
is that audit committees are composed entirely of independent directors. For a
discussion of changes in the roles of auditors and audit committees, see infra
Part 1I.C.1.
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"earnings management."35 Those goals benefit not only the inshareholders and other
vesting public, but also the long-term
36
constituents of public corporations.
As a practical matter, after serious accounting scandals,
corporations routinely bring in law firms to work closely with
new accounting firms to help solve these problems. 37 Getting
this cooperation as part of the normal audit process should be a
logical part of preventive law and accounting practice. Law35. The need to include corporate attorneys in the audit is underscored by
what the SEC Chairman recently called the "noticeable erosion" in the quality
of corporate financial disclosure, caused by the propensity for corporate managers to manipulate financial statements to meet analysts' forecasts with a
"gimmick known as earnings management." See Anna Snider, Levitt Challenges Lawyers to Fight Accounting Fraud,N.Y. L.J., Feb. 16, 1999, at 1. Under my proposal, corporate attorneys would assist in preventing this misconduct. By contrast, under current rules and norms of corporate legal practice,
some corporate lawyers may actually assist in this misconduct, or at least defer to the judgment of the senior inside managers engaged in "earnings management." By treating these managers as though they were the corporate client, attorneys help to keep relevant information "confidential" from the board
of directors or its audit committee. See infra Part II.C.3. Thus even in such an
egregious case of "earnings management" as the massive fraud of Charles
Keating and the managers of Lincoln Savings and Loan, the ABA Task Force
in 1993 concluded that counsel had no duty to advise the independent directors of their client. See REPORT, supra note 8; infra Part III.A (discussing
other cases of alleged attorney assistance in corporate misconduct).
36. Of course, failing to disclose material information or allowing managers to control earnings via accounting subterfuges might harm corporate miscreants or short-term investors who happen to sell at an erroneously inflated
price. It is hard to imagine that these are the corporate constituents that the
corporate entity is legally constructed to serve, however. See generally Steven
M.H. Wallman, The ProperInterpretationof CorporationConstituency Statutes
and Formulationof DirectorsDuties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991) (discussing why shareholders cannot be treated as a uniform class within an identical
set of interests, and why directors must serve the long-term wealth appreciation interests of the corporate entity). If we believe in the rule of law, we
should be able to postulate that complying with federal securities laws is in
the long-term interests of public corporations. Cf. John A. Humbach, The NationalAssociation of Honest Lawyers: An Essay on Honesty, "Lawyer Honesty"
and Public Trust in the Legal System, 20 PACE L. REV. (forthcoming 1999)
(manuscript at 94-96, on file with author) (arguing that in current practice
lawyers often effectively seek to circumvent the rule of law).
37. This occurred, for example, after serious problems were discovered at
Cendant Corp., W.R. Grace & Co., Sunbeam Corp. and Livent Inc. The law
firm of Willkie, Farr and Gallagher has become a specialist at working with
accounting firms. See Snider, supra note 35, at 7. In addition, after the serious financial scandals at Salomon Brothers, a former general counsel of the
SEC was brought in as chief of internal audits. See Simon M. Lorne, Corporate Governance and the Audit Committee, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW
WORKSHOP 1999, at 519-24 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1134, 1999).
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yers, accountants and independent corporate directors would
function better in the increasingly rigorous multi-party gatekeeper regimes that are evolving to protect large public corporations. 38 Requiring lawyers within MDPs to play a role in the
audit function should move all transactional corporate practice
in the direction of helping corporations achieve transparency
and disclosure.
Part I of this Article criticizes the current position of the
SEC for failing to recognize that MDP-transactional legal practice can provide a richer and more context-sensitive model for
corporate lawyers to exercise meaningful independence and
loyalty on behalf of their corporate clients. Part II describes
how recent changes both in our understanding of the nature of
large public corporations and in the rules and practices of corporate governance now require a different role for corporate
lawyers. Congress, the SEC and even the accounting profession recognize that accountants and corporate audit committees
must be the activist lynchpin for corporate compliance monitoring.3 9 If lawyers do not play a functionally related role,
these regimes will not work. Part III compares the ethical features that could evolve in MDPs' legal practice with the currently accepted paradigm of corporate legal practice. This Article concludes that reasons for optimism exist as MDPs
increasingly provide legal services to corporations. The new
competitive market for legal services can be a lever to shift the
behavior of corporate lawyers. Market pressures from MDPs
and corporate clients are helping to end the bar's selfregulation and may result in new and better contextual practice rules. Corporate lawyers may even regain some of the independence and moral force that the bar has enjoyed in the
past.
I.

THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND
MDP LEGAL PRACTICE

On June 8, 1999, the American Bar Association's (ABA)
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice issued a report with
unanimous recommendations that would allow MDPs to deliver
legal services. 40 The Report did not address what is perhaps

38. See infraPart II.C.1.
39. The 1995 amendments to the federal securities laws make clear that
the detection of fraud is part of the audit function. See infra Part 1.C.2.
40. See REPORT, supra note 8. The Report recommends that Rule 5.4 be
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the most important problem faced by audit firms that provide
legal services to the same client: whether the lawyers would
disclose confidential information to the audit engagement partner who in turn might have a duty of disclosure to the outside
world. Instead, the Report merely assumed that lawyers in
MDPs must provide the same confidentiality to their clients
that law firms do. By ignoring this issue, the Commission
missed the opportunity to establish contextual rules for the
in MDPs, including a different standard
transactional lawyers
41
for confidentiality.
The SEC responded to the ABA's proposal by stating that
the "SEC will continue vigorous enforcement of its rules on
auditor independence, and that.., those rules prohibit an
auditor from certifying the financial statements of a client with
which his firm also has an attorney-client relationship." 42 In
totally revised and includes proposals to assure that only qualified lawyers
would provide legal services, that they would continue to be bound by ethical
rules, be able to exercise independent judgement and continue to be subject to
the bar's vague and unenforceable requirement to provide pro bono legal services. See id. The Report only acknowledges that the SEC believes "auditor
independence regulations specifically state that the roles of auditors and attorneys under the federal securities laws are incompatible," and has asked the
Independence Standards Board for guidance about auditor independence in
connection with legal services. Id. at n.3.
41. Perhaps the issue was ignored so that auditors would be rendered unable to provide legal services. In any event, the ABA Multidisciplinary Practice Commission's proposal received such harsh criticism from lawyers that it
has been withdrawn. A major criticism of the official rules of legal ethics is
that they are categorical and do not reflect the importance of adapting to varied contexts. For a criticism of the unitary and non-contextual ethics of the
organized bar, see SIMON, supra note 19, at 7-13; David B. Wilkins, Making
Context Court:Regulating Layers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145,
1167-82 (1993). The problem is perhaps greatest in corporate representation
because these categorical rules were designed primarily for adversarial proceedings and are particularly ill-suited to transactional corporate representation. Even Model Rule 1.13, the specific rule adopted for representing organizations like the corporate client, has been criticized as overly vague and
providing less protection to corporate clients than individuals. See Stephen
Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289 (1987); infra Part III.A
(discussing and criticizing Model Rule 1.13); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Fact
and Fiction in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Should the
ConfidentialityProvisionsRestate the Law?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903, 930
(1993) ("[T]he term 'lawyering' is a euphemism for a variety of professions.
The codes fail to acknowledge differences between a law firm, corporate counsel and sole practitioner. They equate litigators, advisors and even lawyers
acting for regulated industries .... ").
42. Letter from Harvey J. Goldschmid, SEC General Counsel, Lynn E.
Turner, SEC Chief Accountant, and Richard H. Walker, SEC Director of En-
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one recent case, In re Falk,43 an attorney/CPA provided legal
services to a corporation that was an audit client of the firm in
which he was a principal. Although he did not participate as
engagement partner or concurring partner on any of the client's
audits, he declined to answer questions about the legal representation, relying on attorney-client privilege. 44 The SEC
found that Falk had violated the standards of auditor independence because of the "fundamental conflict between the
roles of independent auditor and attorney."45 The SEC, citing
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., explained that auditors
must be "skeptical," a posture which requires "total independence," while lawyers have "a duty to serve as the client's confidential advisor and loyal advocate." 46 The SEC also pointed to
forcement to Philip S. Anderson, President, American Bar Association (July
12, 1999), available at <http:/www.abanet.org/cpr/goldschmidt.html>. The
SEC's auditor independence regulations specifically state that the roles of
auditors and attorneys under the federal securities laws are incompatible.
Rule 2-01(c) of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(c) states that in determining whether an accountant is independent of a particular person, the SEC
"will give appropriate consideration to all relevant circumstances, including
evidence bearing on all relationships between the accountant and that person
or any affiliate thereof, and will not confine itself to the relationships existing
in connection with the filing of reports with the Commission." Qualifications
and Reports of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (1999). The Commission further stated in an interpretive release, which as been incorporated into its
Codification of Financial Reporting Polices, that one of the relationships that
must be considered in making independence determinations is the relationship created by rendering legal services. The SEC stated:
Certain concurrent occupations of accountants engaged in the practice of public accounting involve relationships with clients which may
jeopardize the accountant's objectivity and, therefore, his independence. In general, this situation arises because the relationships and
activities customarily associated with this occupation are not compatible with the auditor's appearance of complete objectivity or because the primary objectives of such occupations are fundamentally
different from those of a public accountant ....
A legal counsel enters into a personal relationship with a client
and is primarily concerned with the personal rights and interest of
such client. An independent accountant is precluded from such a relationship under the Securities Acts because the role is inconsistent
with the appearance of independence required of accountants in reporting to public investors.
Letter from Lynn E. Turner, SEC Chief Accountant, to Sherwin P. Simmons,
Chair, Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, American Bar Ass'n (Jan.
22, 1999), availableat <http//www.abanet.org'cpr/turner.html>.
43. Charles E. Falk, Exchange Act Release No. 41,424 (May 19, 1999),
availableat <http//www.sec.gov/enforce/adminact/34-41424.htm>.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984)).
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the requirement in Model Rule 1.3 that a lawyer must act "With
zeal in advocacy on the client's behalf."47
Although the SEC reached the correct result in Falk, it
failed to recognize that the predominant and almost exclusive
role of a transactional lawyer is one of advisor and not advocate. Indeed, as discussed more fully below, having transactional lawyers act as advocates can cause substantial harm.
The analysis in Falk therefore perpetuates the false dichotomy
established in United States v. Arthur Young & Co. 48 The SEC
should instead allow and even encourage corporations to employ MDPs that require their lawyer to communicate about a
client with the audit partner. Of course, this should never be
allowed in the context of litigation, for which stricter confidentiality is probably necessary, 4 9 but the ethical rules should at
least recognize that litigation is not the sole, nor even the
dominant, model for legal services.
The SEC has become more aggressive in requiring directors to act as monitors in order to learn about financial improprieties. 50 Boards must be diligent in preventing "earnings
47. Id.; see also Samuel George Greenspan, Securities Act of 1933 Release
No. 6097, 49 S.E.C. Docket 1086, 1099 (Aug. 26, 1991); Samuel George
Greenspan, Litig. Release No. 12862, 48 S.E.C. Docket 1690, 1691 (May 23,
1991). The conduct that occurred in Falk, which the SEC is certainly correct
in prohibiting, appears to be permitted under the misguided standards of the
ABA Commission's Report. Such.a result would have preserved confidentiality at the expense of an honest, independent audit.
48. In fact, in the context of transactional corporate practice, lawyers can
be much more effective as advisors if they are not advocates. The current involvement of practitioners who act both as advisor and advocate in determining what information reaches auditors and audit committees actually increases the likelihood of audit failure. Non-advocates are better reputational
intermediaries, and the lemons market problem is avoided. See infra note 169
(explaining the "lemons market" problem). Ironically, some opponents of the
Multidisciplinary Practice Report argue that it diminishes the role of attorneys as advocates. See Debate on MultidisciplinaryPracticeReport Continues
as Vote by ABA DelegatesNears, 68 U.S.L.W. 2020-21 (July 13, 1999).
49. But see generally Humbach, supra note 36 (arguing that confidentiality, among other things, provides an excuse for many lawyers to bend the
truth in the course of client representation).
50. See, e.g., Peter R. DeGeorge, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Act Litig. Release No. 15,556 (Nov. 12, 1997), cited in Lorne, supra note 37, at
508 n.3 (criticizing the board for failing to detect improper transfer of corporate assets to a separate company co-owned by corporate insiders); The Cooper
Cos., Inc., Exchange Act Litig. Release No. 14,351 (Dec. 12, 1992), cited in
Lorne, supra note 37, at 509 n.4 (criticizing the board for failure to make
timely inquiry after senior insiders exercised their privilege against selfincrimination); Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30,532 (Mar. 31,
1992), cited in Lorne, supra note 37, at 516 n.10 (criticizing the board for fail-
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management." 51 Because fiduciary duties of corporate directors
are more rigorously observed under state law, the SEC is demanding a similarly high level of care under federal law both
for directors and independent auditors. 52 A multi-party gatekeeper regime is emerging, with liability under both state and
federal law, to help ensure accurate financial reporting.53 Diure to disclose possibility of overseas losses).
51. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT
FINANCIAL REPORTING 24 (1987) [hereinafter TREADWAY COMMISSION
REPORT]. In 1987, the Treadway Commission pointed to the importance of the
need for "smooth earnings" as a source of fraudulent financial reporting. See
id. On December 15, 1999, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt criticized the continuing "culture of gamesmanship" in financial reporting. Statement of
Chairman Arthur Levitt on Audit Committee Oversight, Selective Disclosure
& Insider Trading (Dec. 15, 1999), available at <http'//www.sec.gov/
news/extra/alsdisc.htm> [hereinafter Levitt Statement]. On June 30, 1999,
the SEC brought a cease and desist proceeding pursuant to § 21C of the Securities Exchange Act against W.R. Grace & Co. for maintaining "excess reserves" in violation of generally accepted accounting principles in order to control the profitability of its Health Care Group. See W.R. Grace & Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 41,578 (June 30, 1999), available in 1999 WL
436502 (S.E.C.), at *2.
52. See Thomas J. Scanlon, Exchange Act Release No. 41,581 (June 30,
1999), available at <http-//www.sec.gov/enforce/adminact/34-41581.htm>
(seeking a cease and desist order against Thomas J. Scanlon, CPA, the engagement partner at Price Waterhouse LLP, in connection with the W.R.
Grace earnings management); infra Part H.A.
53. Dean Joel Seligman wrote in the early 1990s that although the duty of
care under state fiduciary law may have been eviscerated by the ready availability of the affirmative defense of the business judgment rule, much of the
duty of care for directors had effectively been federalized and was the subject
of SEC 2(e) enforcement and cease and desist proceedings. See Joel Seligman,
The New CorporateLaw, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 56-60 (1993).
State fiduciary duties, however, seem to be becoming more meaningful.
See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68, 97172 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that directors' failure to pay due attention might not
be protected by the business judgment rule).
On December 15, 1999, SEC Chairman Levitt proposed new SEC rules
and stressed the need for "greater integrity in the financial reporting and
public disclosure process." Levitt Statement, supra note 51. This federal law
concern is consistent with a heightened fiduciary duty for directors under
state law. In 1998, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified a strict fiduciary
duty of candid disclosure. In Malone v. Brincat,722 A.2d 5, 11-12 (Del. 1998),
directors were charged with authorizing the release of financial statements
with grossly overstated financial performance. In reversing the decision of the
Court of Chancery, the Supreme Court held that the director's duty of disclosure is a specific application of general financial duties, and does not require
that the directors make a request for shareholder action. See id. The court
also observed that disclosure could affect a shareholder's decision to hold
rather than to sell securities, for which they would not have a remedy under
federal securities law. See id. Moreover, when shareholder action was sought
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rectors and audit committees, however, need assistance. 54 This
assistance should include attorneys, rather than allow attorneys to act as inside management's confidential advocates. 55

based on inaccurate disclosures, directors would be liable for a virtually per se

violation of a fiduciary duty even without proof of reliance, causation or quantifiable monetary damages. See id.
In a recent article, Melvin A. Eisenberg has argued that despite the applicability of shield statutes that limit liability of directors, and an expansive
business judgment defense as a standard of review, recent process-oriented
Delaware case law has had the expressive effect of making directors more
careful, independent and diligent. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1278-83.
54. The 1999 Blue Ribbon Committee calls audit committees the "ultimate
monitor[s]." Blue Ribbon Committee Report, supra note 17, at 1071.
55. The SEC actively sought this role for transactional lawyers in the
1970s. See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 712-15
(D.D.C. 1978). The organized bar actively and successfully opposed this position. See Susan Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others
FrameIt to Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1080-84 (1993). In providing
corporations with the option to use MDP attorneys for transactional work if
they agree to full disclosure, the SEC would have the chance both to test its
policy and to avoid the organized bar's self-serving self-regulation. The SEC
now has an excellent opportunity to advance the effectiveness of auditors in
detecting fraud if it encourages cooperation and shared responsibility between
the providers of auditing and transactional legal services.
Such a monitoring regime would have numerous advantages. First, the
independence of MDPs would become more meaningful because they would
have access to more information and accordingly would become more powerful.
Knowledgeable auditors and transactional lawyers would share information
and expertise about all potentially material developments. Auditors currently
have a duty to disclose material information. The combination of this increased knowledge and duty would actually enhance trust. See Wilkins, supra
note 41, at 1159 n.57.
Second, senior inside managers, independent boards and audit committees could not use corporate lawyers to keep information from audit committees or to help manage facts and legal arguments favoring managers over the
interests of the corporate entity as a whole. If accountants and lawyers can
coordinate as multi-party gatekeepers, this would be movement in the direction of the kind of concerted efforts of numerous institutions that are necessary to improve the corporate governance system as a whole. See Werner F.
Ebke, In Search of Alternatives in Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governanceand the IndependentAuditors Responsibilities,79 Nw. U. L. REV. 663,
719-20 (1984).
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II. THE CHANGING CONTEXT FOR REPRESENTING
CORPORATE CLIENTS
A. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The realities of corporate governance within large American corporations have undergone dramatic change over the
past century.5 6 The traditional model of corporate governance
typically involved shareholder selection of a passive board proposed by a powerful CEO, but in the 1970s the neo-classical
school of economics developed a new theoretical model.5 7 This
model presented the large public corporation as a nexus of contracts among suppliers of capital, labor, materials and managerial services.5 8 The neoclassical school proposed that the modem public corporation minimized problematic agency costs by
linking managers' compensation to share price value-a firm's
share price reflects the extent to which investors believe that
managers will eschew opportunism and work to maximize
profits.5 9 In addition to linking pay to performance, the model
proposed that monitoring devices, such as the use of outside directors and independent auditors, further deterred management wrongdoing.6 0 While the neoclassical model has enabled
us to better understand public corporations, it has been heavily
56. In 1932, Berle and Means wrote that large American corporations
were no longer merely a private business tool or device, but had instead become a dominant institution with an enormous effect on economic, political
and social life. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 18 (1932). The tremendous
amount of capital necessary for industrial organization had become too great
for single entrepreneurs or families to be able to provide, and the administrative task of managing these ventures became so complex that large teams of
well-trained, full-time professional managers were necessary. See ALFRED D.
CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND--THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 484-90 (1977).
57. See Ira M. Millstein, Introduction to the Report and Recommendations
of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate
Audit Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1057, 1060 (1999). See generally Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Conception That the CorporationIs a Nexus of Contracts, and
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999). Corporations during
the first half of the twentieth century were subject to substantial agency costs
under the traditional model because powerful managers inevitably acted for
their own benefit at the expense of the corporation.
58. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 822' (arguing that the corporation is
"a nexus of reciprocal arrangements").
59. See COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 39-40 (1997).
60. See 1 COXETAL., supra note 24, § 9.3.
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criticized for not adequately reflecting the behavior of human
agents and for minimizing the importance of legal and institu61
tional mechanisms in reducing agency costs.
The agency model, in which managers serve as the agents
for shareholder principals, has traditionally been linked with
the neoclassical "nexus of contracts" corporate model.6 2 As
such, the agency model has provided a comfortable theoretical
justification for the organized bar's view of corporate counsel as
deferential servants of inside senior managers. 63 Neoclassical
theorists have fueled the bar's perception that powerful inside
managers are the client by portraying the relationships between shareholders, boards of directors and individual managers as a nexus of contracts among self-interested individualistic
components. Consequently, corporate lawyers routinely treat
senior inside managers as surrogates for the corporation and
provide these managers with the benefit of the lawyer's loyalty
and confidentiality.64
Recent events, including the hostile takeovers of the 1980s,
have gone a long way toward discrediting the agency model of
the public corporation. 65 These developments have helped to
generate economically informed legal scholarship about the
public corporation that seems to better describe how corpora-

61. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 261-65 (1999). See generally Robert C.
Clark, Agency Costs Versus FiduciaryDuties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 55-81 (1987) (arguing that the fiduciary duty of
loyalty is a solution to the problem of agency costs).
62. See Blair & Stout, supra note 61, at 254. The agency model was
overly sanguine about the ability of the market to reduce agency costs by
aligning the incentives for managers with those of the shareholders. Boards of
directors today, instead of being linked with management under the fiction
that boards have the ultimate authority to manage corporations, are increasingly composed of independent directors whose primary duty is to monitor the
performance of insiders. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1279 ("Today, the
monitoring model of the board has been almost universally accepted and
adopted in large publicly held corporations."); see also PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANcE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS, PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT §§ 3.01, 3.02 (Mar. 31, 1992) (arguing that senior executives should supervise the management of large publicly-held corporations). Directors are
now much more active and attentive. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1279.
63. See Peter C. Kostant, Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Course of Corporate Governance and Counsel's Changing Role, 28 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 203,
209-13 (1999).
64. See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking:A Legal Theory of the Firm,
16 YALE L. & POLY REV. 265, 327 (1998).
65. See Kostant, supranote 63, at 215-20.
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tions really function and should provide a much richer and
more nuanced role for corporate counsel.
The most sophisticated theory for the large public corporation is the Team Production Model. This recent model sees
large public corporations as having evolved primarily to solve
the team production problem of how to allocate profits. The
model is at least in part contractarian because it views the corporation as composed of various stakeholder constituencies that
have agreed to provide plenary authority to a non-stakeholder
independent mediating hierarch, the board of directors. 66 In
66. See David Millon, Communitarians, Contractariansand the Crisis in
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1377-78 (1993) (defining contractarians as believers in an anti-regulatory model of corporate governance).
Recent changes in corporate law and behavior are consistent with the role that
the Team Production Model posits for the board of directors. Thirty states
have recently adopted corporate constituency statutes that underscore the importance of board independence, and directors increasingly set policy and
monitor insiders. Constituency statutes provide a legal smokescreen for
managerial anti-shareholder entrenchment, and represent the end of management's legal obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1447 (1993); Eisenberg,
supra note 57, at 833-34. The statutes can therefore be viewed as reafirming
that directors must act in the long-term best interests of the corporate entity.
See Waliman, supra note 36, at 163-70 (arguing that corporate constituency
statutes shape the proper standard of directors acting in the best interest of
the corporation).
Eisenberg argues that shareholder privacy is required to protect the owners of the corporation and that the Team Production Model requires placing all
constituencies "on an equal footing." Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 833. He
also suggests that recent constituency statutes like those of Pennsylvania and
New York eliminate shareholder privacy. See id. at 833-34. These concerns
are overstated. All groups are not equal under the Team Production Model.
Further, constituency statutes recognize that it may be necessary to harm
shareholders. The long-term best interests of the entity as a wealth-producing
going concern must be recognized. This is ultimately consistent with the longterm best interests of shareholders. Note that Pennsylvania provides that directors consider "the best interests of the corporation." Id. at 833 (citing PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1715(a), (b) (West 1995)). New York's statute
urges directors to "consider the corporation as a going concern." Id. at 833
(citing N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1998)). The statutes do not
enable any group to be favored above the corporation. See Wallman, supra
note 36, at 167-68.
The best interests of the corporate entity are "cognizable and identifiable
even if they cannot be readily quantified." Id. at 191. The purpose of the corporation is the ongoing, long-term generation of wealth. See id. at 170-71.
Private shareholders may own the corporation, and hold the residuary interest, but they are not a monolithic class; their investment horizons differ
widely, and the degree of shareholder diversification greatly affects their tolerance for risk. See id. at 173-77. This helps to explain why the long-term in-
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the absence of self-dealing, therefore, the board acts as the final
arbiter for deciding all corporate policies and allocating profits
ex post among the constituents, in what the board believes is
the best long-term interests of the corporate entity as a going
concern. The Team Production Model can be developed to further emphasize the importance of institutional norms that are
generated by cooperation, trust, honesty, transparency and
fairness.6 7
The Team Production Model provides a useful perspective
from which to view modern corporate governance. A key insight is the importance of preventing any corporate constituency from capturing the board of directors and causing it to act
in that constituency's self-interest, rather then in the best longterm interests of the corporate entity.6 8 The model, therefore,
provides a more nuanced role for the board of directors, as distinguished from powerful inside corporate officers, than the
older simplistic agency model in which corporate governance
consisted of management agents generating wealth for shareholder principals.
Lawyers must, of course, understand the structure and interests of their corporate clients in order to serve them competently. Legal ethics has traditionally treated corporate management as unitary and has hardly differentiated between

terests of the corporate entity and the shareholders coincide--even if absolute
wealth maximization were somehow possible, no single corporate strategy
could maximize the wealth of every individual shareholder. For that matter,
we can never really know if wealth has been maximized or merely enhanced.
Generating greater wealth is always at least arguably possible. An elderly
tailor once declared that if he was Rockefeller, he would be richer than Rockefeller because he would make suits on the side. Who can prove that he was
wrong?
Some of the skepticism about the constituency statutes arises from the
perception that they give too much additional discretion to management which
has abused its discretion, especially in the area of executive compensation.
See William H. Simon, Comment: On Kohler, Hansmann, and Chapman,43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 629, 631 (1993). This kind of abuse can be avoided under the
Team Production Model if directors are truly independent and if, as argued in
this Article, they recognize the importance of not being captured by inside
senior managers, the most powerful stakeholders.
67. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 1425-26 (pointing to these values in institutional process analysis).
68. See Blair & Stout, supra note 61, at 252. In this way, the model is
very similar to transaction cost economics which recognizes corporate governance as an inexpensive way to protect constituents tied in a long-term, incomplete contracts from opportunism. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness,
Trust, and Economic Organization,36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 457-59 (1993).
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officers and directors. 69 Examining corporations through the
lens of the Team Production Model enhances our understanding of the problem of agency costs because it underscores that
"management" is composed of two very different groups: inside
senior executives that are the most powerful group of
stakeholders, and the board of directors, who "are not agents of
the corporation but are sui generis. 7 0
The traditional economic analysis of the corporation has
greatly under-emphasized the importance of the opportunism of
powerful inside senior agents who, as illuminated by the Team
7
Production Model, are the most powerful stakeholders. 1
Moreover, the hierarchical nature of the corporation, in which
subordinates do what they are told with little effective opportunity to question orders, increases the likelihood that inside
managers can behave opportunistically. 72 Only corporate counsel, independent directors and auditors are in a position to act
as a check on management. Corporate counsel should not act
as management's co-conspirators.
All of the competing economic theories of the corporation
view agency costs and agency theory too narrowly and underestimate the importance of legal rules to control managers. 73 Too
much of the analysis of agency costs centers on the costs of
shirking by subordinates viewed from the principal's perspective.74 "Principal costs" 75 are neglected. Corporations are hierarchical institutions in which powerful agents in superior positions really function as quasi-principals. 76 The colorful term
that Eric Orts coined for opportunistic misconduct by quasiprincipals is "sharking," which occurs when managers redistribute assets away from other powerful constituencies. 77 Powerful managers are able to "shark," and corporate lawyers cur69. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 732-36 (1986).
70. Clark, supra note 61, at 56.
71. See Orts, supra note 64, at 317.
72. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 828 (noting that instructions to subordinates generally exclude "the subordinate from considering any reason for
action except the direction").
73. See Orts, supranote 64, at 327-29.
74. See id. at 315 ("[Slhirking refers to the costs of all agents in a firm
who choose to further their own self-interests at the expense of the collective
interests of the firm.").
75. Id. at 270.
76. See id. at 267-70. For example, CEOs are agents that act as de facto
principals with substantial inherent authority. See id. at 281.
77. See id. at 315.
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rently do not adequately interfere with this behavior. Examples of sharking include excessive executive compensation, oppression of minority shareholders, unjustified harm to debtholders or other stakeholders, restructuring the corporation to
benefit managers 78 and earnings management to manipulate
financial statements. Managers can often shift at least some of
79
the cost of their conduct to the corporation.
A moral hazard problem results from such cost-shifting for
several reasons. Managers may gain disproportionately from
risking corporate funds, a great deal of opportunistic conduct
will never be detected, responsibility for misconduct can be
easily deflected, and management compensation can never be
perfectly tied to performance. Corporations not only suffer
when their managers steal, or "shark," but are also vulnerable
to more innocent misconduct. Managers will often make misrepresentations to advance their own personal goals.80
The problem of moral hazard intrinsic to corporate insiders
is best solved by a multi-party regime of independent gatekeepers. 81 Corporate lawyers, as fiduciaries to the whole corporate

78. See id. at 280.
79. Moral hazards arise when one party to a contract passes on the cost of
his or her behavior to the other party. See KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR,
PRINCIPLES OF EcoNoMIcs, at G7 (1992).
80. See Elliot J. Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI
CorporateGovernanceProject, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 33 (1984).
81. Admittedly, it is difficult to achieve complete independence, and to the
extent it is possible, complete independence also might make gatekeepers too
cautious, thus harming corporations. The best solution seems to be a system
of overlapping and redundant gatekeepers. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at
1283-84. This system should hold gatekeepers liable when they fail to be independent and vigilant. See id.; see also George C. Harris, Taking the Entity
Theory Seriously, Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 597, 620-36 (1998) (discussing cases in which lawyers and accountants were held liable in negligence for failing to protect their corporate
clients from their own senior managers).
Senior inside managers may act recklessly to conceal material information
when confronting corporate losses. See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules,
Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399,
1415-16 (2000) (applying prospect theory to demonstrate a possibility of reckless behavior among corporate insiders). This tendency may be exacerbated by
the moral hazard problem inherent in agency costs. See id. at 1420. Lawyers
in MDPs sharing the strict disclosure duties of auditors would be in a better
position to counteract this harmful tendency than would traditional lawyers.
See id. at 1420-24. Moreover, the traditional posture of lawyers makes them
vulnerable to assisting in concealment when conditions sour, especially if their
advice contributed to increased liability exposure. See id.
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entity, must be alert to the danger of sharking by powerful inside managers. 82 Traditionally in corporate practice, and in accordance with the currently vague and permissive Rule 1.13,
the board of directors has very little direct contact with corporate counsel. 83 Powerful insider managers have unfettered use
of corporate lawyers. The shield of attorney confidentiality is
an enormous aid for management sharking, and makes effective monitoring more difficult. The ambiguous dual agency
status of insiders increases the need for transparency and full
disclosure. Insiders must not be allowed to hide behind attorney confidentiality.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF NEW CORPORATE NORMS
In recent years, scholars have recognized that social norms
play a very important role in a system of social control.8 4 Re82. Shareholders are quasi-principals. Occasionally they exercise ownership rights of control, but generally they do not. Sharking can be better understood as a product of dual agents and ambiguous principals. The law of
agency recognizes that with full disclosure, dual agency is possible, and agents
can represent competing or even antagonistic interests. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 313 cmt. c (1958). Agency law must be carefully examined rather than used in a conclusory fashion to address the problem of
sharking.
83. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1983).
84. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 540 (1998). Social norms are rules and regularities of
behavior that, as a definitional matter, exclude legal rules enforced with legal
sanctions and organizational rules enforced by formal sanctions. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1255. There are three types of social norms: descriptive norms (regularities that are not obligatory and not self-consciously followed); conventions (norms that are followed self-consciously but without an
obligation to do so); and obligational norms (those which are self-consciously
followed but not enforced by a law or an organizational rule). See id. at 125658. Norms develop from the formation of belief systems based upon the availability of information, reasoned persuasion, or both. See id. Obligational
norms play an important role in compliance with the law. See id. at 1257.
They may be followed for instrumental reasons, for example because compliance or noncompliance will have a reputational effect, or they might be internalized so that conscious deliberation is unnecessary for compliance. See id. at
1257-58. Although social norms can sometimes reinforce immoral behavior,
they can also play a very important role in supporting compliance with the
law.
Legal rules and social norms have a complementary relationship. Legal
rules can be expressive and supply the information needed for a norm to develop. Also, there is a strong "metanorm" that legal rules should be obeyed.
See id. at 1260 n.2. Therefore, even when legal violations are difficult to detect or expensive to enforce, they could still be informally enforced, either
through social disapproval or the self-enforced compliance of internalized
norms. See id.
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cent changes in the behavior of directors of large public corporations have been driven more by the development of new social norms than by the threat of liability or incentives for financial gain. 85
Directors have become more careful, more
attentive, more concerned about independence and the structure of corporate governance and more active in setting agen86
das for corporate strategy.
The evolving norms that apply to public corporations, and
especially those of independent directors, institutional investors, and the accounting profession, are increasingly diverging
from those of the organized bar. The opportunity for large corporate clients to employ MDPs rather than attorneys who follow traditional legal ethics may be one way clients are using a
changing market to reject an ethic that no longer serves them
well. This may be occurring because of legal developments that
have both clarified the duties of directors and changed organizational structures so that boards behave differently. Although the legal changes may not necessarily have increased
directors' exposure to liability, the law has had an expressive
function in changing corporate belief systems about directors'
duties of care and loyalty.
The fastest changing fiduciary duty, at least in the bellwether state of Delaware, may be the duty to make accurate
disclosure of material information. Pressure is coming both
from state law cases 87 and from the SEC to ensure that boards
fully and accurately disclose material information to investors. 88 The availability of accurate information can also be crucial in the formation of belief systems. Eisenberg has written
that "[w]ithin the last ten years, an inefficient nonobligational
norm that licensed and insulated a low level of directorial care
85.

See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1253.

86.

See id. at 1282.

87. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9-10 (Del. 1998) (holding that
directors have a fiduciary duty to disclose financial information to shareholders accurately); Zim v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 780 (Del. 1993) (holding that
the nondisclosure of material facts to shareholders means material from the
standpoint of a reasonable director); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d
278, 279-80 (Del. 1977) (holding that a tender offer failed to make the required
full disclosure); Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., Inc., 519 A.2d 116, 126 (Del.
Ch. 1986) (holding that, in tender offer and merger transactions, the duty of
directors to disclose "soft" information should be determined on a case-by-case
basis).
88. These have occurred both by enforcement actions against accountants
and by pressure on corporate audit committees. See infra Part I1.C (discussing the gatekeeper enforcement regime).
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has been replaced by a more efficient obligational norm that
requires a higher level of care."8 9 He attributes this to changes
in the corporate belief system. 90 What was the source of information from which this superior belief system developed? In
part it resulted from the more stringent state and federal disclosure requirements, which may themselves have resulted
from the realization that corporate inside managers were not
being either as effective or honest as agency theorists had
maintained. This realization stemmed from the takeover
frenzy of the 1980s, the savings and loan crisis, and the continuing saga of audit failures and fraudulent financial reporting.

C. THE EXPANDING MULTI-PARTY GATEKEEPER ENFORCEMENT
REGIME FOR PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
1. The Audit Committee as "Ultimate Monitor"91
Recent developments in corporate governance indicate a
greater reliance on monitoring compliance with corporate obligations by using an increasingly sophisticated gatekeeper enforcement strategies. These involve liability or incentives for
third parties who are not the primary authors or beneficiaries
of misconduct, but who are able to prevent or disrupt it.92 Public gatekeeper strategies based upon liability have long been
common in the law and many private enforcement regimes also
exist in which the market offers rewards and subsidies. Gatekeeper regimes can become exceedingly complex and may involve both liability and reputational incentives. 93 Hybrid systems with public and private components can also evolve. For

89. Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1265.
90. The expressive power of law can be very important in generating
norms by helping to clarify conduct, make it concrete and add moral weight.
See id. at 1269-70. If the norm is inconsistent with a general belief system,
however, it will neither be internalized nor instrumentally followed because it
will have little reputational payoff. See id.
91. Blue Ribbon Committee Report, supra note 17, at 1071 ("[Tihe audit
committee is ... the ultimate monitor of the process.").

92. See Kraakman, supra note 11, at 53.
93. See id. at 56; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239, 288-93 (1984) (discussing "third-party verification techniques"); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
522-26 (1983) (referring to reputational "hostages" that can reduce transaction

costs).
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the public corporation an increasingly complex, multi-party
gatekeeper regime is developing.
The role of corporate directors as gatekeepers has expanded enormously in recent years. 94 This has resulted, at
least in part, from clearer definitions of the fiduciary duty of
care and an expanding fiduciary duty of disclosure and good
faith, at least in Delaware. Commentators have argued persuasively that changing social norms within large corporations
have also contributed to directors behaving far more energetically as active gatekeepers.9 5 Ira Millstein has written that the
"evolution of modem corporate governance that began in the
1970s was rooted in financial reporting issues."96 In the 1970s,
management had enormous discretion in selecting accounting
principles for financial reporting.9 7 Auditors' opinions might
not have reflected information that was somehow not required
to be disclosed by specific generally accepted standards.9 8 Even
in the 1990s, one survey found that forty-seven percent of executives would intentionally misstate financials to show a
greater profit.9 9 The intractable problem of fraudulent financial reporting thus focused directors' attention both on corporate management and the accounting profession.
The recent trend in corporate governance has been for the
board of directors, and especially independent directors, to re94. See Kraakman, supra note 11, at 61-66 (discussing gatekeeper criteria); see also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9-10 (Del. 1998) (discussing corporate directors' fiduciary duty of disclosure); In re Caremark Intl Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing the board's duty to
monitor as part of its fiduciary duty of care); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8A1.2 (1997) (discussing application of instructions to organizations
and an effective organizational program to prevent and detect violations of
law, and creating strong financial incentives for organizations to comply with
the law).
95. See Millstein, supra note 57, at 1060 (stating that prior to the 1970s
boards were generally "management-dominated, passive," and merely a rubber
stamp).
96. Id.
97.

See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION:

A LEGAL ANALYSIS 187-98 (1976) (discussing the "[flailure of the
[aiccountants").
98. See id. at 204 (paraphrasing a 1972 speech of SEC Chairman William
Casey).
99. See Seamons, supra note 27, at 273 n.33 (citing Blalock, ForMany Executive[s],Ethics Appear To Be a Write-off, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1996, at Cl).
Such statistics underscore the fact that independent directors need all the
monitoring assistance from corporate counsel they can get. See Howell E.
Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: EnlistingLawyers To Improve the Regulation of FinancialInstitutions,66 S.CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1042-44 (1993).
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duce agency costs by monitoring the performance of corporate
managers. °° The expanding fiduciary duties of corporate di-

rectors are increasingly making the directors gatekeepers for
detecting and preventing corporate wrongdoing, and accountants are increasingly becoming a crucial part of this multiparty gatekeeper enforcement regime. Indeed, "the evolution of
modern corporate governance" has been "rooted in financial reporting issues."10
Despite continuing attempts to improve the quality of financial reporting and to avoid fraudulent practices, however,
decades-old calls for reform have yet to prompt an adequate response to the problem of fraudulent financial reporting. 0 2 The
severity of the problem did not abate even after the Treadway
Commission put forward comprehensive recommendations in
1987.103 In fact, serious accounting improprieties have recently
been on the increase1 °4 Accordingly, in July 1999 the Blue
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate
Audit Committees issued a comprehensive report and recom100. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Boardof Directorsand Internal Control,
19 CARDOzO L. REV. 237, 244-50 (1997) (discussing why the responsibility for
internal control should be vested in the board). This expanded role for independent directors is set out in the Principles of Corporate Governance, the
ABA CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, and the Business Roundtable's Corporate
Governance and American Competitiveness. See id. at 238-39. Eisenberg explains that boards are best suited to act as the ultimate monitors in corporate
organizations because of the problems of asymmetrical information in hierarchical organizations and because of the problem of managerial opportunism.
See id. at 244-50. Independent directors have been given ultimate responsibility for monitoring because of certain structural advantages. First, outside
directors can be more objective than insiders, and have less incentive to slant
information in a self-serving manner. See id. at 244-48. Unlike inside managers, independent directors are not dependent upon short-term results for
promotion or compensation. See id. Moreover, they can broadly evaluate the
welfare of the entire corporate enterprise rather than focusing on a single
component for which they are responsible. See id. They are also more likely
to be able to make a necessary but unpopular disclosure, because they can do
so without losing their livelihood. See id.
101. Millstein, supranote 57, at 1060.
102. See id. at 1058.
103. See generally TREADWAY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 51; see also
Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 243 (discussing the Treadway Commission's report).
104. See Laurie B. Smilan, FinancialFraud. The Blue Ribbon Committee's
Recommendations, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1999, at 565 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1136, 1999). The reasons for the rise
in fraudulent reporting are the growing number of new and inexperienced
public corporations and the fact that corporations are increasingly "slaves to
analyst expectations." Id.
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mendations. 0 5 On December 15, 1999, the SEC endorsed the
Committee's work and proposed new rules based upon its rec06
ommendations.l
An analysis of the recommendations contained in the reports of the Treadway Commission 0 7 and the Blue Ribbon
Committee'0 8 provides two important insights. First, directors,
and especially independent audit committee members, must
become part of a multi-party gatekeeper regime, together with
internal and independent auditors. Independent audit committee members face greater exposure to liability if they are not effective monitors, and they will need help to do their jobs. 1' 9
105. See generallyBlue Ribbon Committee Report, supra note 17.
106. See Levitt Statement, supra note 51. The proposed rules for enhancing audit committee effectiveness included, among other things, quarterly reviews for early identification of significant accounting issues. See id.
107. The Treadway Commission Report declared the reporting of financial
information in the United States to be the "best in the world," but advised that
improvement was necessary to respond to increasing fraudulent reporting.
See TREADWAY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 51, at 5. The recommendations effectively pointed to the need for a multi-party gatekeeper regime of top
corporate managers, boards of directors, independent public accountants, the
SEC, regulators and other law enforcement agencies. See id. at 1. Corporate
counsel were not included in the list. See id. The reporting duty of public corporations flows to all their constituents, and the role of the public auditor in
making full disclosure transcends any contractual relationships auditors may
have with the corporation. See id. at 5. The report acknowledged that academics needed to assist in helping to formulate a new ethic. See id. at 6. The
commission blamed a narrow focus on profits and the need for "smooth earnings" as causes of fraudulent reporting, see id. at 23-24, and recommended the
use of audit committees, improving the quality of audits, new SEC sanctions
and greater criminal prosecution; see id. at 14-15. The report made six specific
recommendations about audit committees because a study of SEC enforcement
proceedings found substantially less fraud in corporations that had audit
committees. See id. at 39-44. In suggesting that audit committees should review corporate plans, the report acknowledged a role for these committees in
important transactions. See id. at 43-44. The commission raised concerns
about a loss of auditor independence as a result of performing other functions,
but recognized that this could also result in CPAs having better knowledge
about their clients. See id.
108. The Blue Ribbon Committee Report focused on the structure and financial aspects of audit committee duties. See Lorne, supra note 37, at 505.
The Audit Committee is to serve as the "ultimate monitor." Blue Ribbon
Committee Report, supra note 17, at 1071. The report contains three categories of recommendations: competence, process and transparency. See Harvey
L. Pitt et al., TougherStandardsfor Audit Committees: The Report of the "Blue
Ribbon" Committee, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP, supra note 37,
at 527-30. The report lists ten "Best Practices" that nowhere mention a role
for corporate counsel. See Blue Ribbon Committee Report, supra note 17, at
1089-93.
109. It may be disingenuous for SEC Chairman Levitt to suggest that the
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Second, like the dog in the Sherlock Holmes story that was conspicuous for not barking in the night, an important role for corporate counsel is notably absent. Accordingly, not only are corporate lawyers not part of the solution, but because lawyers can
adhere to the norms of the organized bar, which increasingly
differ from those of corporate clients, lawyers remain part of
the problem. 110
Much of the best criticism of the recent Blue Ribbon Committee proposal is that it does not provide ways for audit committee members to obtain the information they need to do their
job."' The very independence of board members and audit
committee members, while vital in one way, assures that indenew duties for audit committees provide only the "remote possibility of increased liability exposure," Levitt Statement, supra note 51, and for Blue Ribbon Committee Co-Chair Ira Millstein to assert that increased liability is unlikely, see Millstein, supra note 57, at 1064-66.
More realistic commentators acknowledge that the more stringent duties
of audit committees will increase their exposure to liability, especially given
the roll-back in liability under the federal securities laws caused by the 1995
amendments. See, e.g., John F. Olson, How to Really Make Audit Committees
More Effective, 54 BUS. LAW. 1097, 1103-05 (1999); Pitt et al., supra note 108,
at 529; Smilan, supra note 104, at 570. Increased liability is good because it
will make the multi-party gatekeeper regime more effective. See supra Part
II.C. Also, liability exposure can be part of a process to increase trust. See infra Part II.C.3. Finally, the expressive power of liability cases against audit
committee members will make their duties more clear and concrete and may
result in norms, both instrumental and internalized (within a changing belief
system), that will be efficient at increasing director care, diligence and constructive skepticism. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1264-87 (discussing the
role of social norms in corporate law).
110. The Treadway Commission Report, on the rare occasions when it mentioned corporate lawyers, was naive about their role. The "Good Practice
Guidelines for the Audit Committee" suggested that committees should meet
with the general counsel and outside counsel. See TREADWAY COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 51, at 180. In mentioning the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Arthur Young & Co. for the proposition that auditors have a
public function that transcends their contractual relationship with the client,
the Treadway Commission was apparently accepting the view that lawyers do
not have a similar function. See id. at 5 (referring to this case without identifying it by name). The report concedes that legal advisors could be part of the
problem when key management personnel did not report accurately because of
a narrow focus on profits and smooth earnings. The report quotes with approval the famous 1934 speech of Justice Harlan F. Stone criticizing lawyers
serving antisocial business practices, but offers no suggestions for changing
the lawyer's role. See id. at 8. In fact, the attorneys for issuers are listed as
potential "victims" of fraudulent reporting. See id. at 26. The flow chart and
table of organization clearly place both the legal department and the internal
audit department below the CEO and reporting to the CEO. See id. at 19.
111. See, e.g., Lorne, supra note 37, at 505. As noted above, the 1999 Blue
Ribbon Committee Report does not even mention corporate lawyers.
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pendent directors may lack knowledge of their companies and
perhaps even their industries. In the 1980s, independent directors were recognized as gatekeepers, but hardly as the "ultimate monitors" that audit committees were to become in the
Blue Ribbon Committee Report. 112 Although the committee's
proposals are certainly salutary, one important question raised
by the report is whether audit committee members can be effective monitors without access to the necessary information. 113 A
former general counsel of the SEC criticized the report for not
even addressing this problem. 14 He also suggested that the
cases in which boards fired CEOs are not evidence that independent boards are effective, but rather indicators of a failure
to identify problems and solve them in a more timely and less
drastic fashion." 15
The information that audit committee members get is "filtered" through senior inside managers, 1 6 often with the help of
corporate counsel who may contribute to the absence of candor
and full disclosure in that process. 117 There are numerous reasons, both reprehensible 1 8 and understandable," 9 that management may be unwilling or unable to provide accurate information. Although the audit committee is asked to be vigilant
and "constructive skeptics,"120 this becomes much more difficult
when corporate attorneys are able to assist inside managers in
filtering information by using their skills as advocates and by
2
keeping information confidential.1 '
112. See Pitt et al., supra note 108, at 529 (referring to the "ultimate monitor" recommendation).
113. See id. at 532.
114. See Lorne, supra note 37, at 505-06; see also id. at 516 (noting that the
board "does not have the tools to discharge what the SEC or others legitimately view as the board's obligation").
115. See id. at 515-17.
116. See id. at 524.
117. See infra Part IIIA (discussing different normative systems).
118. See Seamons, supra note 27, at 273 n.33 (discussing the financial
fraud problem).
119. See Daniel C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities
Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and OrganizationalBehavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV.
629, 638-48 (1997) (discussing the cognitive psychology of corporate reporting).
120. Olson, supranote 109, at 1111.
121. For example, the ABA Task Force in 1993 concluded that Kaye,
Scholer had no duty to advise the Lincoln Savings and Loan Bank about the
activities of Charles Keating and Lincoln's inside managers. See Wilkins, supra note 41, at 1167-68 & n.93 (citing TASK FORCE ON THE LIABILITY OF
COUNSEL REPRESENTING DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,

FIRST INTERIM REPORT (1992)). This underscores the current state of confu-
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Chief executive officers and senior managers presumably
prefer not to share information with the board in situations
where this would reduce their power. Because corporate counsel continue to behave as though the senior inside manager
alone is to receive their loyalty and confidentiality, audit committees of the board get less information. The lawyer as advocate may indeed be advocating on behalf of inside managers
against the best interests of the entity. Confidentiality reduces
the availability of information, which can result in inefficient
norms and belief systems. 22 For audit committees and outside
auditors to be successful, they must become part of a concerted
action that carefully coordinates the legal, economic and social
systems in which the corporation operates. Yet, to a large degree this common-sense idea has been ignored. The Principles
of Corporate Governance authorizes audit committees to retain
independent legal counsel to assist them, 23 but mandate no
role for the corporations' own legal counsel who, as a practical
matter, may be assisting opportunistic managers in circumventing disclosure. Not providing information about illegal activities to the board was the very conduct that the ABA Task
Force in 1993 concluded did not violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.124
Although the Blue Ribbon Committee and the SEC do not
mention corporate lawyers as part of the monitoring regime, it
is clear that requiring their cooperation would help audit comsion about the applicability of Model Rule 1.13. Thus, while Kaye, Scholer
may have engaged in legally prohibited conduct, "many prominent lawyers insisted that they had not, and for them that fact would have been sufficient to
establish the propriety of their conduct." SIMON, supra note 19, at 8. Simon
described the response of the organized bar as "pervasively disingenuous and
irresponsible." See William H. Simon, The Kaye, Scholer Affair: The Lawyers'
Duty of Candor and the Bars' Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 243, 243 (1998). The bar did not examine the charges objectively. The ABA appointed a "Working Group on Lawyers' Representation of
Regulated Clients," which issued a report concluding that the allegations were
baseless. See id. at 263-65. The report stated that Rule 1.13 did not require
the law firm to advise the board of directors that senior managers were engaged in fraud. See id. at 263 n.29. Rather than discussing a duty to protect
the entity from harm, the report treats the inside managers who were engaged
in massive fraud as though they were the client, and speaks of "interference
... that the client entity may not welcome." Id.
122. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1271.
123.

See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 3.05 (1992).

124. See Wilkins, supra note 41, at 1167-68 & n.93 (citing TASK FORCE ON
THE LIABILITY OF COUNSEL REPRESENTING DEPOSITORY
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, FIRST INTERIM REPORT (1993)).
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mittees. Lawyers serving the corporate entity as a whole
should be expected to make full disclosure to audit committees
and never use reliance on confidentiality to justify nondisclosure. This would help to modify greatly the usual understanding of the vague duties set forth in Model Rule 1.13.125 Although lawyers are not immune from bias and the possibility of
cognitive confusion, 126 they are trained to be probing and skeptical. Independent directors and audit committee members
may lack knowledge of the company or its industry. 27 They are
generally not trained as lawyers or accountants, and they often
lack the time to be thorough. 28 Corporate lawyers, on the
other hand, do have the necessary time and training, but because they are co-fiduciaries with management to the corporation (co-agents and not sub-agents) 129 they are the vital "inside
outsiders" needed to advise and augment audit committees.
There is no clear rule that lawyers must act for audit committees rather than inside senior managers, and this is not part of
the behavioral norms of corporate lawyers. One way for corporate audit committees to get the full benefit of all legal services
paid for by the corporation would be to hire MDPs to provide
these services, if the SEC would allow the practice subject to
would make full disclosure to
the understanding that lawyers
130
audit engagement partners.

125. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.13 (1983); supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the rule).
126. See Langevoort, supra note 119, at 647-48 (discussing the lawyer's
role).
127. One recent quantitative study found that increasing insider representation on board finance and investment committees significantly increased
contemporaneous stock returns and returns on investment. See April Klein,
Firm Performanceand Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 275
(1998). The possible explanation for this is that outside directors have less
knowledge about corporate activities and less time to devote to their jobs. See
id. at 278. If this explanation is accurate, placing outside directors on the
audit committee may not be a panacea. One critic of the Blue Ribbon Committee Report believes that it overloads outside directors with a duty to micromanage and fails to recognize that they are neither lawyers nor accountants.
See Olson, supra note 109, at 1106-07.
128. See Olson, supra note 109, at 1106-07.
129. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.13:105.
130. One may well ask why it is necessary to use MDPs rather than just
pass a board resolution instructing the company's lawyers to report to the
audit committee. The answer is that it is not necessary, but that initially using MDPs, which have an institutional history of full disclosure, seems less
radical and can be better integrated into a system with which the participants
are familiar. It is also a way to avoid the protestations of the organized bar.
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It is very surprising that the Blue Ribbon Committee Report does not mention corporate lawyers because like directors,
lawyers owe an independent fiduciary duty to the corporation.
Lawyers are trained to use constructive skepticism, a skill that
auditors should also have. In addition, only lawyers are licensed to analyze certain issues that must be addressed in
audits, such as legality, scope of fiduciary duty and materiality.
Thus corporate lawyers, if made independent of managers,
would have the time, training and objectivity to act as the "inside outsiders" necessary to enable audit committees to func31
tion effectively.'
2. The Changing Role of Independent Auditors
While studies, reports and commissions have focused on
the responsibilities of the board, and especially independent
audit committees, to act as monitors of financial reporting, new
legal obligations and norms within a new belief system are also
developing for accountants. The traditional view was that accountants could assume that corporate management was honest, but this view has changed dramatically. 132 Formerly, the
auditor was viewed as "a watchdog, not a bloodhound" 133 and
auditors were not supposed to act as "detectives hired to ferret
out fraud, but if they chance[d] on signs of fraud they may not

avert their eyes.... ."134 This perception has changed, at least
for the auditors of public corporations registered with the SEC.
Accountants have traditionally been corporate gatekeepers
because of their position as "public watchdog[s]." 135 Although
the effectiveness of accountants in ensuring corporate accountability has been criticized for at least sixty years, there has
been a continuing trend to require accountants to play a more
aggressive role as external independent monitors. 136 Independ131. See Olson, supra note 109, at 1111 (advising that directors need to exercise constructive skepticism, though without mention of corporate counsel).
132. See Seamons, supranote 27, at 259.
133. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal. 1992) (holding
that investors could not recover from an auditor under general negligence theory).
134. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 1982)
(emphasis added).
135. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984)
(discussing the role of public accountants).
136. See Ebke, supra note 55, at 674. The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations explained that accountants are no longer merely expected to report irregularities to manage-
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ent accountants play an important role in assuring the accuracy and fairness of the financial statements and in providing
corporate accountability. 137 The AICPA Cohen Report stressed
that the primary role of accountants is no longer to report irregularities to management, but to act as external, independent evaluators. 138 As conventional, internal controls have
failed, accountants are seen as an important alternative device
39
for control. 1
In the terse terms of Joel Seligman: "[iln the real world,
the language of corporate governance is accounting." 140 Accordingly, much actual corporate regulation is done through accountants. Whereas state corporate law rarely concerns accounting, the SEC can regulate accounting standards, and
since 1983 the SEC has frequently invoked violations of the
federal securities laws for audit failures resulting from management misleading auditors. At least for the large public corporations that must report to the SEC, failure of internal controls to measure and describe corporate performance, is no
longer merely a possible violation of the state law fiduciary
duty of care-it can also be prosecuted in SEC auditing proceedings. 14 1 These proceedings generally focus on the work of
corporate audit committees and outside auditors. Most of the
cases involve misrepresentations or omissions in financial
ment. See id. at 674-75; cf.TREADWAY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 51, at
23-24 (discussing causes of breakdowns in financial reporting, and concluding
that managers who were under performance pressure cooked the books and
treated independent auditors as fair game to be deceived). Instead, accountants have become "agent[sl of social control" who should function as independent evaluators. Ebke, supra note 55, at 674-75 (citing COMMISSION ON
AUDITORS' REsPONsIBILITIEs, REPORT, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (1978)).

137. See Ebke, supra note 55, at 674-75.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 702-03.
140. Joel Seligman, Accounting and the New Corporate Law, 50 WASH &
LEE L. REV. 943, 945 (1993).
141. See id. at 949 (offering an illustration of an SEC auditing proceeding).
The remedies that the SEC may seek include judicial injunctions, discipline
against professionals under rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice,
proceedings against registrants under § 15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange
Act, cease and desist orders against accountants or registrants, and reference
to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. See id. at 950. Numerous enforcement actions that were brought against accountants were really
intended to have a deterrent effect on the corporation. See id. at 950-51; cf.
Ebke, supra note 55, at 683 (arguing that financial liability of accountants
should not be expanded because rather than detecting wrongdoing, such liability merely socializes losses while profits remain individualized).
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statements. While the state law fiduciary duty of care has traditionally provided little real control on management, SEC enforcement proceedings against accountants are common and
are really intended to deter misconduct by corporations. 142
When Kraakman first wrote about the "anatomy" of gatekeeper enforcement regimes in the 1980s, he starkly contrasted
gatekeepers with whistleblowers. 143 Kraakman concluded that
gatekeeper duties are common while whistleblowing requirements, which include a duty to disclose wrongdoing, are rare. 144
He attributed this to a cultural aversion to informing and the
drastic results that it produces. 145 The dichotomy between
gatekeepers and whistleblowers has become less clear because
of recent developments in corporate governance. The 1991
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for corporate crimes greatly increase the penalties of corporations found guilty of criminal
violations, while offering powerful incentives for detecting and
46
reporting wrongdoing and cooperating fully with prosecutors. 1
Therefore, corporate directors, as part of their fiduciary duty of
care, may be required to blow this whistle on employees and
managers.147
Independent auditors, the classic gatekeepers, 148 also now
have a greater whistleblowing role, at least when they are dis-

142. See Seligman, supranote 140, at 950.
143. See Kraakman, supra note 11, at 58; see also Bernhard Grossfeld &
Werner Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation:A Comparative View of
CorporatePower in the United States and Europe, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 397, 421
(1978) (acknowledging the inefficiency of shareholder control devices like
proxy voting and derivative suits, and concluding that "[tihe most important
and most effective devices of control are today imposed from outside the corporate system").
144. See Kraakman, supra note 11, at 58.
145. See id. at 58-59.
146. See In re Caremark Intl Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (discussing the Sentencing Guidelines).
147. Practitioners say that the government now requires corporations to
serve up their wrongdoing managers on a "silver platter." See, e.g., Jeffrey W.
Nunes, OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines: The Conundrum of Compliance
Programsand Self-Reporting, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1039, 1053 (1995).
148. See Kraakman, supra note 11, at 64. Even attorneys, whose duty to
maintain client confidences is strict, have a rather large loophole through
which they can act as whistleblowers by making "noisy withdrawals." See 1
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.6:315. The organized bar has opposed the
use of this remedy, and the extent to which courts or regulators will require its
use is unclear. Nevertheless, it at least provides a basis for attorney whistleblowing. See id.

1246

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1213

charged by reporting companies. 149 The 1995 amendments to
the securities laws substantially expand the legal requirement
for whistleblowing-type disclosure. 150 These disclosure duties
increase the responsibility of accountants to be effective gatekeepers. Section 301 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires audit procedures "designed to provide
reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a
direct and material effect on... financial statement[s]."151
Auditors are no longer merely "watchdog[s]," but now "blood152
hound[s]" or "detective[s]" whose duty it is to ferret out fraud.
Rather than presenting a stark dichotomy, gatekeeping
(with the preservation of confidences) and whistleblowing (with
a duty to disclose confidences) are best seen as points on a continuum in which the potential to disclose will often increase the
effectiveness of the ability to deter wrongdoing. Similarly,
Kraakman's distinction between two types of gatekeepers, the
bouncers and the chaperones,15 3 is also becoming less distinct
149. See infra note 152 (discussing Form 8-K filing requirements).
150. See generally Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
151. Id. § 301; see also Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449,
454 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that auditors are not detectives to ferret out fraud);
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal. 1992) (stating that auditors are watchdogs, but not bloodhounds). One reason for the new duty is that
in California 28 of 30 savings and loans that failed had received clean audit
opinions. See supra note 27.
152. Seamons, supra note 27, at 259. Pursuant to Section 10A of the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC may modify audit procedures and discipline accountants who fail to meet these new standards. See id. at 261. Today's auditors must be whistleblowers. See id. at 262. After detecting or becoming
aware of information indicating that an illegal act may have occurred, regardless of materiality, accountants must determine the likelihood of whether
an illegal act occurred, whether the act is "clearly inconsequential," and its
possible effect on financial statements. See id. Illegal is defined broadly and
includes regulatory violations and violations of foreign law. See id. at 265.
The accountant must, "as soon as practicable," inform the appropriate level of
management and assure that the audit committee (or board of directors if no
audit committee exists) is adequately informed. If the accountant concludes
that the illegal act has a material effect on the financial statements, "but senior management and the board have not taken timely and appropriate remedial action, and such nonaction is reasonably expected to warrant departure
from a standard audit report or resignation," the accountant must state this
conclusion in a § 10A Report to the board of directors. Id. at 262-63. The
board then must notify the SEC within one business day of receipt of the report. See id. at 263. If the board does not act within one business day, the accountant must resign, triggering the requirement that the client file a Form 8K within one business day, thus notifying the SEC. See id.
153. See Kraakman, supranote 11, at 62-66.
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for corporate governance. Bouncers are gatekeepers that must
withdraw their services and thereby exclude a wrongdoer from
the market, 154 while chaperones remain in a continuing longterm relationship with the potential wrongdoer during which
time they endeavor to detect and disrupt wrongdoing. 55 Accountants act as bouncers when corporations cannot undertake
a transaction without a clean audit opinion. 156 Because accountants are involved in long-term relationships and are subject to the 8-K filing requirement, they also serve as chaperones. The 1995 Amendments increase the requirement that
accountants act as bouncers, but this probably makes them
more effective as chaperones as well.
The same salutary effect can be expanded to the role of a
lawyer in the MDP context. If directors hire MDPs to provide
legal services, and require all material information that MDP
transactional lawyers learn to be provided to the audit partner,
the directors would conflate the roles of transactional attorney
and accountant. It is logical for the board to use lawyers as
supplemental monitors given both the heightened liability of
directors for failure to monitor and accurately disclose material
information, and the corporate norms of caution and attentiveness. By using MDPs to provide both auditing and legal servthe lawyers to be more acices, clients are effectively requiring
57
tive as chaperone gatekeepers.
154. See id. at 63.
155. See id at 62-63.
156. See id. at 62; Painter, Toward a Market, supra note 32, at 255-61 (explaining that the short turn around time for accountants to report misconduct
would seem to make them unable to insist that clients take corrective action).
On the other hand, the threat of exit and disclosure may enable accountants to
succeed without triggering the one day window. See id.
157. Albert 0. Hirschman has written eloquently about how institutional
problems can sometimes be cured by various applications of "exit" or "voice" by
See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
constituents.
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES

(1970). "Exit" occurs when "customers stop buying the firm's products or some
members leave the organization." Id. at 4. As a result, "revenues drop, membership declines, and management is impelled to search for ways and means
to correct whatever faults have led to exit." Id. "Voice" occurs when "lt]he
firm's customers or the organization's members express their dissatisfaction
directly to management.., or through general protest addressed to anyone
who cares to listen." Id. As a result, "management once again engages in a
search for the causes and possible cures of customers' and members' dissatisfaction." Id. Loyalty, which is functionally very similar to the relational trust
needed for joint ventures, can reduce exit and increase the effectiveness of
voice. See id. at 76-105. By making exit much more costly for a corporation
whose gatekeeper must resign (acting as a whistleblower), corporations have
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Judicial innovation has been very important in developing
gatekeeper regimes. 158 Raising the penalties for both primary
and third parties can be an effective way to make gatekeeping
regimes work. 159 This has been done by greatly increasing the
penalties for corporate crimes, 160 expanding liability for director
gatekeepers who fail to monitor effectively 161 or make candid
disclosure of material information, 162 and recognizing liability
for lawyer and accountant gatekeepers who negligently fail to
prevent harm to corporate clients caused by corporate managers. 16 3 In addition, by greatly reducing the penalties for corporations that detect and disclose criminal activities, and requiring directors to cooperate in the prosecution of wrongdoers, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer a "legal bribe" to encourage gatekeeping. 16 4 Moreover, because correctly settling the
sanctions for misconduct is never more than an educated guess,
lowering the sanctions as the duty approaches strict liability
can be effective. 165 This may explain why actual liability for directors is decreasing while the norms are requiring greater care
to protect one's reputation. 166 Thus, recent developments in
an incentive to increase the loyalty of their gatekeepers (staying on as chaperones) and remonstrating with revitalized voice. See id. at 92-105; see also
Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary
Obligation,43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547, 560-71 (1993); Kostant, supra note 63, at
240-45. But cf Wilkins, supra note 41, at 1172 (arguing that whistleblowing
duties for lawyers for federally-insured thrifts might result in weaker compliance reviews by "reduc[ing] the lawyer's ability to wield clout as a powerful
and knowledgeable insider for the purpose of encouraging thrifts to comply
with legal limitations").
158. See Kraakman, supra note 11, at 85.
159. See id. at 70-71.
160. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1997).
161. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968-70
(Del. Ch. 1996).
162. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11-12 (Del. 1998).
163. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (discussing cases in
which lawyers and accountants have been found negligent for failing to prevent harm to their corporate clients).
164. Kraakman, supra note 11, at 70-71 (describing how legal bribes can
encourage gatekeeping).
165. See id. at 78.
166. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1280-82. In Malone, the materiality
test for disclosure approaches strict liability, but the candor cases can be read
as aspirational because despite the strict duty, no cases have actually found
directors liable. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 11-12. Similarly, although the
Caremark duty of care is rigorous, the directors of the company that paid $250
million in criminal fines and damages were found not to have violated the duty
of care. See Caremark,698 A.2d at 960-61, 971-72.
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corporate law seem to be leading to a community of167gatekeepers, consisting of directors, accountants and lawyers.
3. Advantages of MDP Transactional Lawyers in Multi-Party
Gatekeeper Enforcement Regimes
Corporations benefit from using MDP transactional lawyers in two primary ways. First, lawyers working within the
ethical constraints of MDPs would follow rules that are better
suited to protecting corporate clients rather than just senior inside managers. The norms of MDPs better fit the evolving corporate belief system of care, transparency, trustworthiness and
accurate disclosure than does the traditional legal ethic of selective nondisclosure. Second, if we examine the institutional
process-related capabilities of large MDPs, as contrasted with
traditional law firms, the MDPs appear to offer clear advantages. 168
The strict duties of confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege, though important for an attorney's litigation role, actually make transactional lawyers less effective as reputational
intermediaries and therefore harm their honest clients. Clients
suffer because the absence of a duty of reasonable full candor
creates an adverse selection problem, or a "lemons market," in
which high quality clients cannot distinguish themselves
through the use of truly trustworthy attorneys. 169 This imperfect information causes inefficient results. Markets, however,
can sometimes adjust in order to create incentives that will
produce better information. For example, despite opposition
from the organized bar in both its rules and its rhetoric, corporate clients in the newly competitive market for legal services
are hiring MDPs for legal services even if they must waive traditional attorney-client confidentiality. These corporate clients

167. See Ebke, supra note 55, at 719.
168. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 1424-33 (calling for a micro-analysis of institutions).
169. The economist George A. Akerlof described how unequal information
can cause the adverse selection problem that results in a "lemons market" for
automobiles. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-92 (1970). Because
sellers of lemons know that they are lemons while buyers do not, more lemons
are sold because sellers of lemons will be paid somewhat more than the value
of a lemon. See id. Buyers eventually realize that they have a greater chance
of buying a lemon, and the price of cars falls. See id. Good car owners become
less likely to sell and eventually only lemons are sold. See id.
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are getting instead lawyers who are better reputational intermediaries.
Independent directors may prefer hiring lawyers employed
by MDPs because MDP lawyers are members of powerful institutions that can better serve large corporations. Today's powerful and sophisticated corporate clients seldom use only one
law firm, or give their attorneys a free hand in determining the
means for achieving the client's goals. In fact, there is evidence
that lawyers for large corporations are less independent than
lawyers with large numbers of individual clients, and generally
more "client motivated" and less "public motivated." 170 As lawyers become less independent, they can become vulnerable to
strategic opportunism by senior managers of corporate clients. 171 Managers willing to risk corporate welfare may try to
get weaker lawyers to assist them or divide work among numerous law firms to hide their overall strategy. To avoid this,
large public corporations and their lawyers may become a kind
of "joint venture" in which both parties need to cooperate and
72
not use their power opportunistically to harm each other.
This mutual forbearance is based upon a social bargain employing "relationship capital," or trust, that the client will use
the legal services for a legitimate legal purpose in return for
of society's most prethe lawyer giving the client access to "one
173
cious and important resources: the law."

170. See David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons from the Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 855,
885-87 (1998).
171. See id. at 886-88. The most egregious example of this type of strategic
abuse of a corporate lawyer can be found in Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d
104 (Ill. 1991). The Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that attorneys were
not entitled to the same protections afforded to laypersons. See id. at 111.
The ACCA, fearing a "caste system" of in-house and outside corporate counsel,
argued that lawyer independence requires the absence of protections from client overreaching. Amicus Brief for the American Corporate Counsel Association at 11-12, Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991) (No. 70942).
On the other hand, Kaye, Scholer and Jones, Day strategically used their
reputations as prestigious law firms to reap extravagant fees from clients engaged in illegal activities. See In re American Continental CorplLincoln Sav.
& Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1449-54 (D. Ariz. 1992) (describing the
involvement of Jones, Day in the Lincoln Savings and Loan failure); Symposium, In the Matter of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler: A Symposium on Government Regulation, Lawyers' Ethics, and the Rule of Law, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 977, 979-84 (detailing the chronology of events leading to the
Kaye, Scholer scandal); see also Kostant, supra note 63, at 214.
172. Wilkins, supra note 170, at 887.
173. Id. at 888, 891.
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How can the development of such trust be encouraged,
when it is natural for lawyers and clients to mistrust each
other? 174 Perhaps one way is to hold lawyers liable for failing
to use reasonable efforts to discover and disclose client wrongdoing-by using their skills to engage in a "sustained, probing,
honest conversation with the client,"175 lawyers can open a
dialogue that creates a relationship of real trust with the client,
not to mention a powerful incentive for clients to comply with
the law. 176 Independent directors thus have an incentive to
177
seek lawyers who will help uncover management misconduct.
Although the norms of the organized bar may do little to
generate trust, other models are becoming available. Independent boards (if not their senior inside managers) can derive
real benefits from a reciprocal relationship with powerful and
independent lawyers. In this context, some of the terminology
of professional responsibility takes on a clearer meaning for
corporate representation. For example, independence, becomes
"interdependence" in a process to discover and disclose material
information, loyalty flows to the corporate entity as represented
by the independent board of directors, and confidentiality cannot be used as a shield for opportunistic misconduct by senior
inside managers.
Trust and loyalty are functionally similar, and corporations
that have a high trust culture may be more efficient and profitable.'7 8 In the joint venture model, trust is increased because
each participant may be liable if it fails to discover misconduct. 17 9 A venerable example of this model is the Section 11 liability of issuers, their senior managers, underwriters, counsel
and accountants in a public offering. 180 The energetic and
174. See Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client,
69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1015 (1981).
175. Id. at 1033; see also SIMON, supra note 19, at 138-69 (discussing the
advantages of using the contextual tort law standard to govern legal ethics).
176. See Burt, supra note 174, at 1033. Burt believed that the ABA lost the
opportunity to build this into the Model Rules. See id. at 1026-55.
177. Incentives for this kind of questioning dialogue with corporate clients
is evolving because courts have begun to hold lawyers and accountants liable
for negligently failing to protect corporate clients from the misconduct of their
managers. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (discussing conclusions to be drawn from cases in which lawyers and accountants have been
found negligent for failing to prevent harm to their corporate clients).
178. See Chapman, supra note 157, at 580-88.
179. See Burt, supra note 174, at 1030-31; see also SIMON, supra note 19, at
57 (asserting that mandatory disclosure increases legal compliance).
180. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994 & Supp. IV

1252

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1213

overlapping due diligence investigations of the powerful participants, which utilize constructive skepticism, has built cooperation and trust and helped to prevent fraudulent or materially erroneous disclosure. The important reputational capital
that underwriters and accountants have developed in the securities markets can expand to corporate financial disclosure as
directors-especially audit committee members and transac8
tional lawyers for MDPs-become participants.1 1
Sophisticated corporate clients should recognize the benefit-better legal services and assistance with monitoring as
part of their law compliance regime-that may be gained by requiring MDP lawyers to disclose all material information to the
audit engagement partner. Such clients would be able to hold
their transactional attorneys to an appropriate ethical standard
in the context of the corporate client's (and especially its outside directors') needs for an effective gatekeeper regime. Disinterested corporate directors, acting in the best interest of the
corporation, could be sure that their transactional lawyers,
audit committees and auditors were cooperating fully in giving
them accurate information about the corporation. The demand
side of the market for legal services would achieve something
that the organized bar has repeatedly failed to do-recognize
ethical
that the practice of law is not unitary, and that18different
2
rules are needed for different practice contexts.

1998).
181. Norms such as trust might play as important a role in preventing
fraudulent or erroneous disclosure as financial liability. See Chapman, supra
note 157, at 588 (noting that loyalty to an organization can actually arise from
an "irony of Adam Smith's invisible hand" in institutions like corporations
where the exercise of "private and highly localized virtues of loyalty and
trust... at least as much as the unconstrained pursuit of self-interest through
contracts, can also add up to the unconscious attainment of a greater good for
all"). Indeed, the expressive function of law can do more to clarify and reinforce norms than the actual dollar amount of liability. In Caremark, for example, the court clarified and heightened the duty of care for directors without
holding the directors in that case liable, though the corporation itself did pay a
substantial fine. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
960-61, 971-72 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1266 (discussing how the level of care has increased while exposure to liability has decreased).
182. Cf. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes,
J.) ("[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic.").
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III. THE INCREASING DISSONANCE BETWEEN THE
BELIEF SYSTEM OF CORPORATE LAWYERS AND
CORPORATE CLIENTS
A. DIFFERENT NoRMATIVE SYSTEMS
The norms of important constituents of corporate governance have recently begun to change dramatically. Corporate
directors are no longer acting as passive rubber stamps to senior inside managers and are instead the ultimate monitors of
corporate operations. 183 In addition, institutional investors
have become more active as monitors and auditors recognize
184
that they have an affirmative obligation to detect fraud.
These norms are driven by instrumental concerns such as the
avoidance of liability or harm to reputation, and are gaining
strength by becoming internalized and self-enforcing. The
norms and belief system of corporate lawyers and the law that
governs them, however, remain at odds with the new norms of
corporate governance. This may explain why corporate clients,
or at least their independent directors and audit committees,
are more comfortable using MDPs to provide transactional legal services.
There are several possible reasons that the norms of lawyers have not yet changed. First, lawyers take their norms, in
part, from court opinions. Only a few cases have explained the
duties of corporate lawyers, however. Courts have therefore
failed to describe the norms that lawyers must follow and make
these norms concrete. 185 Second, the belief system of lawyers is
so powerful that little reputational harm will occur if it is followed, and there is small reason to consider, much less internalize, new values. 18 6 Under the unitary model of legal ethics
based upon an adversary ideal, clients that are self-interested
and intent on exploiting others may be rewarded if their lawyers stonewall. The problem is even greater for self-interested
managers within a corporation. Opportunistic managers intent
on "sharking" may have the corporation's lawyers practice

183. See supra notes 57, 95 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part II.C.2.
185. See Koniak, supra note 55, at 1079-91.
186. For example, even after Kaye, Scholer paid $41 million to settle a lawsuit, the organized bar declared that the firm had not violated ethical norms.
See Kostant, supra note 27, at 494-97; see also supra notes 121, 171 (discussing the Kaye, Scholer affair and the bar's response).
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"loophole lawyering" and employing creative ignorance. 187 Such
tactics can prevent boards from getting the information they
need. The bar's interpretation of ethical rules governing the
conduct of lawyers accused of keeping harmful information
away from independent boards is not one to fill an independent
director with confidence.
Rules of legal ethics that are intended to advance basic
principles of professional conduct, like loyalty or independence,
have become disassociated from the norms to which such ethical conduct should conform. 188 The meaning of "loyalty" becomes even more suspect for a lawyer representing an organization, as opposed to an individual.
Although making
disclosure of a client's intended illegal behavior to save a third
party may be deemed necessary but "disloyal" disclosure, Rule
1.13 does not even allow "loyal" disclosure outside the corporate
entity for the purpose of protecting the entity itself-even taking action within the organization is discouraged. 8 9 The
"loyal" refusal to interfere with the authority of inside managers means that corporate lawyers have been unable (or unwilling) to protect their corporate clients. A meaningful duty to the
entity, and not to senior inside managers, has hardly been recognized. The special needs of organizational clients to be pro-

187. See Kostant, supra note 27, at 526-27 (describing "loophole lawyering"); supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (describing "sharking").
188. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV.
1, 54-56 (1988). For example, Rule 5.4 ("Professional Independence of a Lawyer") has been largely ignored in connection with MDPs that provide legal
services. The rule states that lawyers shall not share legal fees with nonlawyers. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 5.4 (1983). The
purported rationale for the rule is that lawyers must not compromise their independent judgment. See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 5.4:101. In fact,
the true rationale of the rule as adopted is economic protectionism, because
the rule rejects the meaningful Kutak Commission proposals that would have
allowed attorneys to practice with nonlawyers as long as they continued to
meet their professional obligations. See id. § 5.4:101-02; see also Green, supra
note 1, at 1127-33; Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: Context, History,
and Process, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1628-31 (2000).
189. The right of corporate counsel to go up the chain of command shows
that the bar's emphasis on strict confidentiality to insure full disclosure to
counsel is flawed because it recognizes that attorneys might nevertheless disclose confidential information. See SIMON, supra note 19, at 57. At any rate,
this right may have little importance in reality, because lawyers tend to keep
the secrets of managers that can hire and fire them, and seldom actually report harmful information up to the ultimate corporate authority, the board of
directors.
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tected from managers who will reap disproportionate benefits
from risky or improper conduct has not been addressed. 190
Traditionally, independence for a lawyer meant the ability
to analyze and act objectively, and to balance obligations to the
client with public responsibilities to the legal system. 19 1 Objective analysis was necessary for a lawyer to meet the duty of
competence in correctly applying rules of law to what were determined to be the legally relevant facts. Learning the "truth"
about such facts when representing a large corporation is no
easy matter, however. 192 Rather than deferring to senior managers, lawyers must exercise the same kind of skepticism as accountants and remain aware of the full range of managerial
misconduct. Lawyers must recognize their own tendencies either to bond with corporate representatives and thereby possibly share their biases, or to appear aloof and independent and
risk being viewed as disloyal and kept out of the
thereby
loop. 193 In corporate practice, independence seldom has the
classic meaning of protecting the entity from managers who act
illegally. Rather, the lawyer must be involved in the more
"complex and subjective" exercise of evaluating the manager's
perceptions. 194 Accordingly, corporate lawyers must recognize
that organizational clients behave nonrationally, and must not
be overly deferential.
Neither the language of Rule 1.13 as finally adopted, nor
its interpretation by the bar, further ethical representation of
corporate entities as much as they should. 195 The duty of a
lawyer to a business client necessarily goes somewhat beyond
the private interests of the client because in transactional and
regulatory practice lawyers are lending their reputations to

190. See supra note 121 (discussing the confusion surrounding Model Rule
1.13, as illustrated by the bar's response to the Kaye, Scholer affair).
191. See Langevoort, supra note 119, at 631-33.
192. Id. at 632.
193. See id. at 638.
194. Id. at 631.
195. The norm that Rule 1.13 encourages is a "don't ask, don't tell" regime
that expressly forbids loyal disclosure, even when there is no other way to protect the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13
(1983). Corporate lawyers have legal and moral responsibilities for how corporations act, however. Corporations are not autonomous individuals that can
be trusted to take responsibility for their own acts. Independent directors
have an incentive to hire professional gatekeepers because ferreting out
wrongdoing by inside managers helps directors meet their heightened fiduciary duties and protect their reputations. See supra Part H.C.1.
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their clients. 196 The mantra that strict confidentiality-an exception to the general rule of not withholding material information' 97 -is essential to a lawyer's ability to discourage future
client misconduct fails to carry persuasive weight. 98 First,
there is little reason to believe that a strict rule of confidentiality is necessary to be able to help prevent client misconduct. 199
Second, in cases like the Kaye, Scholer scandal, the law firm
seemed to make little or no attempt to discourage wrongdoing,
so the need for a strict rule becomes even more doubtful. 2°° Finally, the strict categorical rule is especially dangerous in the
context of corporate practice, because it can actually harm the
client. Although the lawyer should defer to the business decisions of managers, what constitutes illegality, breach of fiduciary duty or materiality are legal decisions that lawyers are forbidden to delegate. 20 1 The fact that corporate managers and
corporate lawyers are co-agents of the corporation means lawyers have an independent fiduciary duty to the entity that
is,
20 2
arguably, breached by excessive deference to management.
Although Model Rule 1.13 purportedly adopts the "entity"
theory, 203 according to which the attorney represents the corpo196. See Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve: The Bar's Response to Kaye, Scholer, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 315, 320 (1998).
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 161, 162 (1981).
198. See SIMON, supra note 19, at 55-57.
199. See id. at 55-61.
200. See In re American Continental CorpJLincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig.,
794 F. Supp. 1424, 1449-55 (D. Ariz. 1992) (discussing the failure of Jones,
Day, the predecessor to Kaye, Scholer in the Lincoln Savings and Loan fiasco,
to attempt to prevent its client from violating the law).
201. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 (1983) (prohibiting unauthorized practice of law).
202. The corporation is a legal fiction that can only hire, fire and consult
with its attorneys through human agents who are not the attorneys' client, but
instead co-agents with the attorney. Thus, managers and attorneys owe allegiance to their common principal, but not to each other. In theory, the attorney must not serve a high official who may be working against the interests of
the entity. In practice, however, Rule 1.13 does little to make this a reality.
203. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1983).
Ironically, although Rule 1.13 was meant to address the corporate client, it
actually provides less protection to corporate clients than individual human
clients would receive. The rule accepts the traditional agency metaphor positing management agents for shareholder principals, yet unlike real principals
in agency law, shareholders have very little power to control management.
See Martin Riger, The Model Rules and CorporatePractice-NewEthics for a
Competitive Era, 17 CONN. L. REV. 729, 738-39 (1984). See generally Ted
Schneyer, Professionalismas Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989) (describing the history
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rate entity rather than a particular group that controls it, the
rule "contributes little in the way of specific dictates" about how
to protect the entity,20 4 and may even do harm. It provides no
guidance when a fellow agent is harming the entity, when the
loyal attorney is discharged by a disloyal manager, or when the
authority of the board is under attack. Attorneys are forbidden
to make loyal disclosure outside the corporation even if all internal review has been exhausted and outside disclosure could
protect the entity.20 5 The cases in which lawyers have been
held liable for negligence in failing to protect the client from its
managers do not even discuss Rule 1.13.206 The rule generally
of the process by which Model Rule 1.13 was adopted and the flaws in the final
version of the rule).
204. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.13:101. The proposed rule
originally provided some protection to the corporate entity, but was revised
after sharp criticism from groups having little expertise in corporate or securities law. See generally Schneyer, supra note 203. The American Trial Lawyers Association took an absolutist position on maintaining client confidences,
on ideological grounds. See id. at 710-12. Because they viewed law practice
from an adversarial rather than transactional or cooperative model, they
viewed the public interest as just an aggregate of individual clients. See id. at
711. Another, very different segment of the litigation bar, the prestigious
American College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL) opposed the right of disclosure as
well, using the old saw that if clients believed that their lawyers might not
keep their confidences, clients would not make full and candid disclosures.
See id. at 719. According to ACTL, lawyers should not be permitted to disclose
wrongdoing by corporate management either to prevent harm to the client or
others, or to rectify harm that had been done utilizing the lawyer's services,
because it was presumptuous for lawyers to "play God." Id. at 720. The rule
as finally adopted contained none of the original provisions that would have
protected a corporate client from its managers. See id. at 721. The original
language proposed was that the lawyer represented the entity "as distinct
from" its directors, officers and other constituents. Id. This was changed to
"the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents," again
placing management in the position of unchallenged power. Id.
205. See WOLFRAM, supra note 69, at 745. Wolfram describes Rule 1.13 as
"too solicitous of organization charts and customary corporate etiquette." Id.
at 746. The question of exactly when agents for a corporation should be able
to disclose adverse information outside the corporation in order to protect the
corporation ("loyal" disclosure) is a difficult one and has generated great confusion. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.13:111. The line between
loyal and disloyal disclosures is somewhat amorphous for corporations because
some constituents may benefit from risking illegal activities while others may
not. Nevertheless, Model Rule 1.13 never allows attorneys to make loyal disclosures to protect corporations, and the ABA has interpreted the rule not to
require that attorneys make disclosures to the board. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFEsSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.13 & cmt. (1983).
206. See Gillers, supra note 41, at 306-09 (discussing two cases from the
Seventh Circuit); Weinstein, supra note 20, at 55-60 (discussing the Kaye,
Scholer case).
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allows the attorney to "assume that corporate officers and employees are performing their duties in good faith."20 7 In this
way it undermines the role that attorneys can play as part of
the monitoring regime of the board of directors.
B. A NEW CONTEXTUAL ROLE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL: FROM
SERVANT TO STATESMAN

As this Article shows, the unitary ethic governing traditional legal practice fits badly into corporate practice. The contradictions inherent in this model, when confronted by the reality of the more contextual MDP transactional legal practice,
might make corporate lawyers the first to break away from the
traditional ethics of the organized bar.
There are two primary reasons that this might occur.
First, corporate clients are the wealthy targets of MDP competition, and the MDPs, which are held to different ethical standards than members of the legal profession, are powerful and
savvy.208 Second, both public corporations and the legal profession are hybrid institutions that have both public and private
attributes. The public dimensions of each have gained increasing recognition. 20 9 Just as past emphasis on the private
nature of corporations is increasingly seen as harmful to corporations and the society of which they are a part, lawyers representing corporations may likewise recover more of their public
function. There is a growing consensus that corporations have
duties beyond the narrow self-interest of their owners. 210
207. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.13:301. Note that this is the
very assumption that auditors are no longer permitted to make.
208. See supra text accompanying note 15 (discussing the "de maximus"
rule).
209. See Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation:PrivateAgent or Public Actor, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673, 1693 (1993). In the nineteenth century,
corporate law was viewed as part of public law and linked to a tradition of
economic republicanism that stressed investment in human capital, reinforced
community ties, the importance of cooperation, and the avoidance of concentrated power or sudden change. See William H. Simon, Contract Versus Politics in Corporation Doctrine, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 511, 519-23 (David
Kairys ed., 1998). In the twentieth century, corporations became a province in
private contract law, as a nexus of contracts disciplined by capital markets.
See id. at 512. At least in theory, lawyers have both a private duty to serve
their clients, and a public duty as officers of the court. See MODEL RULEs OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Preamble (1983). Under the traditional rules and
norms of practice the first duty has overwhelmingly trumped the second, but
in the evolving context of corporate representation these disparate duties may

become easier to reconcile.
210. The public nature of corporations is being recognized as states adopt
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Similarly, lawyers could serve meaningful public as well as private purposes in representing powerful corporations by occupying what some have called the role of lawyer-statesman of
the past,2 11 rather than being simply business servants.
The legal system is a public good, like roads and a public
education system,2 12 but some have observed that the ethics
that govern legal practice are also a public good. 2 13 Facilitative
norms assist in the development of private law, like most of
corporate law, but this private law is supported by the coercive
power of the state. Thus, when lawyers act in the traditional
fashion, they may help their private clients to exercise rights
that inflict unjust and disproportionate harm on others. 2 14 This
tension between public and private would be clearer for public
corporations if their attorneys insisted on enforcing the express
and implied contracts among the corporate constituencies, and
never assisted in opportunistic breach. Recognition of this duty
would help to expand the narrow concept of client representation in the direction of serving broader interests of complex or21 5
ganizations without harming society or the system of justice.
constituency statutes, pension funds become important institutional investors,
and the need to meet sudden, global competition again places a premium on
cooperation. See Simon, supra note 209, at 528-35 (discussing institutional
investment by pension fund managers); supra note 66 (discussing constituency
statutes).
211. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 21.
212. JAMES A. CAPORASO & DAVID P. LEVINE, THEORIES OF POLITIcAL
ECONOMY

12-14, 89-95 (1992)

213. See Wilkins, supra note 170, at 891 (discussing the ethics of the joint
venture model in which lawyers provide "exclusive access to one of society's
most precious and important resources: the law").
214. See SIMON, supra note 19, at 26.
215. Rule 1.13 goes to great lengths to assure that corporate lawyers do not
act in a manner too independent of corporate managers, but transaction costs
economics nevertheless recognizes the possibility for opportunistic breach
within the corporation and the rule makes such misconduct by inside managers (called "sharking") exceedingly difficult to check. See Williamson, supra
note 68, at 458. These breaches will rarely be detected or remedied. Lawyers
may come to harm when managers behave opportunistically, by either incurring liability for not protecting the corporation despite reliance on the bar's
interpretation of Rule 1.13, or getting discharged by corrupt managers for
trying to protect their client and being left without a remedy. As a mechanism
allowing corporate counsel to favor powerful managers who act opportunistically in ways that could harm corporations or others, Rule 1.13 became detached from ethical norms of corporate governance. As Robert Gordon has
written, "the order of rules and norms, policies and procedures.., is not some
alien excrescence" but what allows "basic ground rules for profit seeking in
commerce and other exercises of personal autonomy." Gordon, supra note 196,
at 321. When these principles are not served, practices need to change.
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Without even mentioning the Model Rules, some important
cases have held attorneys and accountants liable for negligence
for failing to protect their clients from the illegal activities of
corporate managers. 216 Despite inconsistencies, the cases indicate four things. First, at least some courts are rejecting the
universalist tenets of legal ethics and holding lawyers in corporate practice to a contextual duty of care and candor. Second,
these courts have moved to advance a multi-party gatekeeper
regime in which lawyers and accountants, as well as corporate
directors, may be liable to the corporate entity for failure to
protect it. Third, corporate lawyers who rely on Model Rule
1.13 and the ABA's interpretation do so at their peril because
they may be found liable in negligence for conduct that does not
violate the Model Rules. 2 17 Fourth, independent directors may
now have a natural ally in corporate lawyers, who are beginning to be held to a higher standard than that required by the
Model Rules.
By using MDPs to provide legal services, corporations are
able to receive important benefits. First, the board of directors
can enlist transactional lawyers in the monitoring process and
get useful additional assistance in carrying out their fiduciary
duty of care. Use of MDP legal services can help prevent inside
managers from using corporate counsel to mislead the directors, who might face.liability for breach of their fiduciary duty
of care2 18 or candor 2 19 due to the managers' misconduct. Second, because the bar refuses to require corporate lawyers to
serve clients by making candid and complete disclosure to the
board, the corporations can turn to an institutional source of
legal services that will do so.
The non-contextual ideology of legal practice has been used
to support a system of norms that rejects values like loyalty,
216. See generally Gillers, supra note 41 (discussing two cases from the
Seventh Circuit); infra note 230 (discussing Clark and O'Melveny & Meyers).
217. In FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1992),
rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), the Ninth Circuit found a triable
issue of negligence because a law firm did not discuss a stock offering with the
client's auditor, former auditor, and former law firm. Such discussions are required in accounting practice, but arguably not by current legal ethics. Pursuant to Rules 1.6 and 1.13 the law firm would have been prohibited from disclosing adverse information that it learned when it represented the client to
the client's new attorneys. See id. It is therefore not surprising that boards
and audit committees may prefer using lawyers that have the same disclosure
obligations to them as their auditors have.
218. See supranote 94 and accompanying text (discussing In re Caremark).
219. See supra notes 24, 94 (discussing Malone v. Brincat).
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independence and the furtherance of justice. 220 The recent developments in areas of law outside professional responsibility
that are discussed above have had an expressive effect on the
norms of corporate governance, and these new norms are beginning to change how corporate lawyers behave. Activist and
independent boards expect different conduct from their counsel.
MDP attorneys are well suited to serve the new values of the
corporate community.
One key failure of the traditional professionalism paradigm
was society's eventual recognition that it could not trust lawyers to place its interests above those of lawyers' clients, especially large corporations. This belief came about at least in
part because of the conspicuous role of lawyers in the savings
and loan debacle 22 1 and the corporate takeover frenzy of the
1980s.222 Corporate governance also changed in response to
these developments, and independent boards began to demand
different legal services. Sophisticated corporate clients no
longer suffered from the same asymmetries of legal information-lawyers no longer had special knowledge that their cli223
ents lacked.
In the developing new contextual paradigm corporate lawyers, whether they work for MDPs, law firms, or in house, may
be growing more independent, because they serve an increasingly independent board rather than powerful inside managers.
In helping the board mediate among corporate constituencies,
lawyers might be able to engage in a deliberative process that
bears some resemblance to Kronman's lawyer statesman. 224 To
the extent that there were once republican lawyers able to engage powerful corporate owner-entrepreneurs in a dialogue

220. See SIMON, supra note 19, at 3 (arguing that only law as an intellectual discipline clings to formalism and rejects complexity and factual particularity). Simon describes the bar's ethical ideology as "stunting" the moral
quality of legal practice. Id. at 25.
221. See Kostant, supra note 1 (manuscript at 715, on file with author).
222. See Millon, supra note 66, at 1375.
223. See Gilson, supra note 10, at 900-01; cf. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350, 371-72 (1977) ("[IThe belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has
become an anachronism.").
224. See supra note 21 (discussing Kronman's lawyer-statesman ideal). By
having real independent power as part of the joint venture model described
above, corporate lawyers in MDPs could perhaps really remonstrate with powerful clients. Geoffrey Hazard has called Gordon's view of independent nineteenth-century lawyers a fantasy, see Hazard, supra note 21, at 1279, but perhaps it can become a reality in the twenty-first century.
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about corporate means and ends, 225 that role was lost when
lawyers began to serve inside managers as though they were
the true clients. Respecting client autonomy became a euphemism for deferring to a powerful manager. Today, as increasingly independent directors actively mediate among constituencies in furtherance of the best interests of the entity, corporate
governance is becoming a more deliberative governance process. As experts on disclosure and procedure, lawyers can play a
meaningful role in governance. Doctrinally, corporate lawyers
are co-agents with management, not sub-agents, and they
therefore owe a fiduciary duty to the entity that is independent
of management's duty. If corporate lawyers focus on meeting
this fiduciary duty, independence and loyalty will take on a
226
richer meaning.
C. THOUGHTS ON THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

The SEC should consider some of the dynamics of how favorable legal changes can be encouraged. The interests of three
groups need to be analyzed in order to make an effective transition from the current system and accelerate beneficial change:
the MDPs; the accounting profession, corporate directors, and
lawyers in traditional firms; and government and professional
regulators or adjudicators. 227 MDPs, first, are moving into an
increasingly dominant position in the market for legal services.
Their growing success will provide an incentive for these firms
to make the emerging system work and use all of their knowledge and expertise, provided the SEC allows them to offer legal
services to audit clients that waive confidentiality. At the same
time, however, other groups involved with issues of corporate
compliance must confront increasing disadvantages. Corporate
225. See Gordon, supra note 188, at 14-16.
226. The Supreme Court of Delaware recently described the purpose of the
fiduciary duty of corporate directors as enabling them to act as a "compass" for
the corporation. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 n.12 (Del. 1998). Likewise,
corporate counsel can be thought of as "gyroscopes" for the board and the corporation. Kostant, supra note 63, at 245 & n.265 (defining a gyroscope as a
navigational device that keeps a vehicle on course, and drawing an analogy to
corporate law practice, where lawyers can facilitate disclosure and effective
dialogue). Perhaps together with independent accountants and directors, lawyers may serve in an effective multi-party gatekeeper regime.
227. In the words of Saul Levmore, MDPs might be called "the new winners" because they are benefiting from legal changes currently taking place,
whereas accountants, directors and lawyers in traditional firms are "the new
losers," because of their increasing exposure to liability. Levmore, supra note
12, at 1657-69.
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directors face expanding liability exposure for breaches of their
fiduciary duties of care and disclosure. 228 Likewise, auditors
were given greater responsibilities under Section 10A when
Congress amended the securities laws in 1995.229 Finally, corgreater liability for
porate law firms may have to deal with
230
non-disclosure of material information.
Nevertheless, lawyers in traditional law firms, at least,
might gain some incentives and benefits from the evolving system. First, many lawyers will become gainfully employed by
MDPs. At the same time, lawyers in law firms will have a clear
competitive advantage because they can provide litigation
services that require strict confidentiality and the attorneyclient privilege. Most importantly, at some level corporate attorneys are in the best position to have the contextual knowl23 1
edge about what their corporate clients really want and need.
228. Following Delaware's raising of the standard for the duty of disclosure, directors may benefit by having transactional lawyers working within
MDPs as well as auditors assisting them with their heightened monitoring
and disclosure duties. See supra notes 24, 94 (discussing Malone v. Brincat
and Delaware's expansion of directors' fiduciary duties); see also supra note
166 (suggesting that the Malone duty to disclose material information approaches strict liability, but may be merely aspirational). By relying on a better monitoring apparatus, it is less likely that directors will ever be found to
have personally breached their fiduciary duties. See supra notes 166, 181 (discussing the Caremark case, in which the directors were found to have exercised sufficient care but the corporation itself had to pay $250 million in
criminal fines).
229. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the 1995 amendments to the securities laws). Congress was able to gain the support of the accounting profession
by giving them incentives to accept their greater responsibilities. These included some protections from liability, including proportional liability, the end
of joint and several liability, and no exposure to a private cause of action for
violating Section 10A. Accountants could also use the clearer rule governing
their investigating and reporting duties as leverage against powerful but uncooperative clients who could not easily discharge them. Finally, the broader
scope of audits would yield larger fees for audit services.
230. See FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1549-51 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding a
corporate law firm liable for not protecting corporate clients from the illegal
acts of senior inside managers); FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744,
752 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (finding that a
corporate law firm owed a duty to its corporate client to ferret out the fraud of
its corporate officers). In O'Melveny & Meyers part of the negligence was failure to insist upon obtaining arguably privileged and confidential information
from the corporate client's prior law firm. See id. at 746-47. This duty is
common for accounting firms, but traditionally did not apply to lawyers.
231. By increasing liability for nondisclosure of material information on
those with the greatest skill and knowledge--corporate lawyers-enhanced
compliance will be encouraged. This is a far cry from the vague and permissive Model Rule 1.13 which arguably rewards ignorance, gullibility and lack of
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Once the self-serving normative structure of a unitary profession serving inside managers is stripped away, corporate lawyers will find ways to compete by offering independent boards
and audit committees what they really want and need. An end
to the "lemons market" problem 232 will enable law firms to
compete as reputational intermediaries.
The more broadly-based market currently emerging is allowing more varied bargaining among those providing and using the services now offered by MDPs. As more institutions
compete to practice law, it has become harder for the bar, as a
comparatively small interest group, to dominate the regulation
of widely needed services. When bar associations and courts
have exclusive power to make regulations, there is relatively
little political accountability. 233 In areas in which both lawyers
and nonlawyers are permitted to provide services (i.e. tax, patent, lobbying, bill collecting), courts and bar associations have
less authority, and standards may be higher.234 The same has
been true in SEC practice, in which lawyers and nonlawyer accountants have largely been held to the same high ethical
rules, 235 and a high standard applies. As broader groups of
participants recognize that a great deal is at stake, the best aspects of the democratic process can come into play, and narrow,
inefficient opposition to constructive change may become less
236
effective.
Perhaps the clearest example of one group of lawyers being
held to consistently high ethical standards of candor in a nonlitigation context is the patent bar, where both lawyers and
nonlawyers can act as patent agents. This provides a fine illustration of how well a system like that evolving in the MDP context can work. In making a patent application, the client and
the attorney each have an independent duty237 to report "all
facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying
the [patent] applications in issue."238 Courts have described the
relationship between applicant and government examiner in
diligence. See supra Part III.A (discussing and criticizing Rule 1.13).
232. See supra note 169 (explaining the lemons market problem).
233. See Ted Schneyer, Foreword, Legal ProcessScholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 41 (1996).

234. See id. at 36.
235. See supra Part I.
236. See Levmore, supranote 12, at 1681-86.
237. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1999).
238. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co.,
324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945).
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fiduciary duty terms because the relationship is a confidential
one and not at "arms' length. 2 39 Complete candor about anything material is therefore necessary. If such a duty applies in
patent practice, how can any corporate lawyer have a less rigorous duty to make affirmative disclosures to corporate direc240
tors when both owe fiduciary duties to the corporation?
Finally, the SEC should also consider forces of change beyond recent economic developments and professional ethics.
Norms of behavior among lawyers and corporate constituents
are shifting as well. An example is the phenomenon of snowballing24 1 -once a critical mass of individuals disobeys a rule
without penalty, their successful defiance changes the norm of
behavior. 242 This seems to explain the widespread breaching of
Model Rule 5.4, which prohibits lawyers from practicing in professional associations controlled by nonlawyers. A possible reason this norm has been breached with such impunity is that it
purports to support independence, 243 whereas under the larger
contemporary system of social meaning,2 " which views attorneys as "servant[s] of business," lawyers are anything but inde245
pendent.
D. TEMPERING
246
FEARFUL

THE OPTIMISM:

SOME REASONS To BE

Substantial dangers exist which could prevent market
forces from eventually squeezing out lawyers who violate the
principle of loyalty to all of the interests they represent in corporate practice.

239. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 565
(5th Cir. 1970), quoted in True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d
495, 501 (10th Cir. 1979).
240. Moreover, directors may be strictly liable for failure to disclose material information. See supra notes 24, 94 (discussing Malone v. Brincat).
241. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR
101-02 (1978).

242. See id.
243. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 5.4 cmt. (1983)
(noting that the rule's limitation on sharing fees is "to protect the lawyer's professional independence ofjudgment"); Fox, supra note 5, at 20.
244. See Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2181, 2182 (1996) (stressing the importance of placing norms in a specific
context of social meaning).
245. See Hazard, supra note 21, at 1260-61 n.116.
246. With thanks to Ian Dury and the Blockheads, Reasons to be Cheerful
(Part3) (In memoriam, 1942-2000).
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First, with respect to MDP independence, the SEC must
recognize that MDPs may provide transactional legal services if
corporate clients agree ex ante that all material information
must be shared with the audit engagement partner. 247 The
problem of MDP independence is certainly a serious one, but
MDPs are already closely tied to their corporate clients, and
adding transactional legal services should not pose an increased threat. Instead, it will make auditors more aware of
material information, and materiality and legality are legal
judgments best made by lawyers with a duty to the MDP.
Second, MDPs must not be able to control law firms without the law firm being required to share material information
with audit engagement partners. Ernst & Young's recent acquisition of a law firm in Washington, D.C., the one United
States jurisdiction with legal ethics rules allowing this, is very
disturbing, despite the firm's purporting to "keep a wall between the lawyers and Ernst & Young."248 MDPs must also not
be allowed to spin off consulting services into separate entities,
249
especially if transactional legal service is part of consulting.
Third, if corporations employ different MDPs that provide
transactional legal services and audits, the MDPs might not
devise consistent disclosure protocols for material information
that its lawyers may learn. To avoid this result, there must be
a requirement for an agreement, ex ante, to supply all material
information to the audit committee of the corporate client, regardless of which firm discovers it.
Finally, the courts must take action. Cases that weaken
the ability of corporate attorneys to protect their clients, such
as Balla v. Gambro,2 50 must not continue to spread. The ABA's
self-serving recommendations for multidisciplinary practice

247. See Painter, supra note 81, at 1404-05 (criticizing the SEC for its focus
on public perceptions rather than actual results).
248. Siobhan Roth, Inside the Ernst & Young Deal, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8,
1999, at 1. The recent scandal at PricewaterhouseCoopers, in which many
members of the firm violated rules intended to prevent conflicts of interest, is
cause for concern. See Floyd Norris, Accounting FirmIs Said To Violate Rules
Routinely, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000, at C1.
249. See Painter, supra note 81, at 1402 (criticizing the "firewall" concept
because of the loss of valuable intra-firm information).
250. See 584 N.E.2d 104, 107-08 (Ill. 1991) (denying legal protection to a
lawyer who protected the corporate clients from the illegal activity of senior
management).
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must be rejected. Last but not least, attempts to de-emphasize
25 1
contextual legal ethics by courts must not succeed.
CONCLUSION
Despite many possible impediments to progress, there are
reasons for optimism as MDPs step in to provide legal services
for corporations. This Article has shown how the changing
market can improve the effectiveness of legal services252by alAllowing corporations to select the services they need.
though much traditional discourse about market-driven competition has emphasized a race to the bottom, recent
developments among well-informed corporate clients could foster belief systems that enhance norms of cooperation, transparency and trust, especially if less information is hidden by ending the abuse of confidentiality. Corporate lawyers, as honest
brokers and "gyroscopes,"2 53 may have an important role to play
in this new system.
The implementation of a regime requiring that transactional lawyers share material information with the audit engagement partner of their MDP, and with the audit committee
of their corporate client, would lead to better compliance with
the laws and to more accurate financial disclosure to investors.
Corporate lawyers would no longer be able to act as advocates
for inside managers seeking to avoid compliance or full disclosure. Under this system, the norms of corporate legal practice
will better conform with the evolving norms of corporate governance.
251. In part, courts can help to prevent this by following recent cases
holding lawyers and accountants liable if they negligently fail to protect their
clients from the illegal activities of insiders. See supra note 230 (discussing
Clark and O'Melveny & Meyers).
252. MDP competition may bring numerous advantages to the market.
Lawyers, with liability exposure for failure to detect some fraud, can use their
skepticism to balance excessive client optimism. MDPs have a long history of
compliance with the law and making full disclosure. Thus, the costs of establishing a new system are avoided. Accountants are also unable to abuse confidentiality and have a somewhat meaningful tradition of peer review. Finally,
by employing MDPs, corporate clients are "opting up" and avoiding the current
default rule of the organized bar. But see SIMON, supra note 19, at 206-10
(pointing to four problems with the current structure of the market for developing contextual legal services, including its overly optimistic psychology, the
greater initial expense if lawyers act honestly, the difficulty of obtaining information and enforcing higher standards, and a low commitment to trustworthiness).
253. See supra note 226.
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